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Adaptation has long been neglected in the debate and 
policies surrounding climate change. However, increasing 
awareness of climate change has led many stakeholders 
to look for the best way to limit its consequences and 
has resulted in a large number of initiatives related to 
adaptation, particularly at the local level. This report 
proposes a general economic framework to help 
stakeholders in the public sector to develop effective 
adaptation strategies. To do so, it lays out the general 
issues involved in adaptation, including the role of 
uncertainty and inertia, and the need to consider 
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structural changes in addition to marginal adjustments. 
Then, it identifies the reasons for legitimate public 
action in terms of adaptation, and four main domains of 
action: the production and dissemination of information 
on climate change and its impacts; the adaptation of 
standards, regulations and fiscal policies; the required 
changes in institutions; and direct adaptation actions of 
governments and local communities in terms of public 
infrastructure, public buildings and ecosystems. Finally, 
the report suggests a method to build public adaptation 
plans and to assess the desirability of possible policies. 
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To limit the negative consequences of climate change on societies, we can either reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation), or adapt to the effects of climate changes (adaptation). 
However, these two options have not been given equal consideration, and adaptation has long 
been  neglected  in  the  climate  change  debate.  This  imbalance  is  indicative  of  the  real 
difficulties inherent in adaptation, like the treatment of uncertainty on the future impacts of 
climate change or a certain number of other methodological problems that will be dealt with in 
this report. It is also the result of the deliberate intention to avoid the discussion on adaptation, 
which is perceived by some stakeholders as a less valid solution because it focuses on the 
consequences of climate change and not on its causes, and even as a dangerous solution since it 
could stand in the way of the discussion on mitigation.   
The situation has considerably changed since the mid-2000s.  The massive dissemination of 
information on climate change has led many stakeholders in the public and private sectors, 
particularly at the local level, to take an interest in the impacts of climate change and to 
ask themselves what they can do to limit the consequences 
(1).  Awareness of the fact that the 
climate  is  going  to  change  whether  or  not  mitigation  policies  at  the  international  level  are 
successful makes the issue of adaptation that much more urgent 
(2).  
For the decision-maker, "adaptation to climate change" is nevertheless very far from 
being an operational concept.   Adaptation  encompasses extremely varied types of actions 
(direct protection of people and assets, actions to support this protection, reactions with respect 
to impacts, etc.), which can be applied to a wide range of sectors (agriculture, water, energy, 
transportation, etc.) with very different problems depending on geographic scales and zones 
(coasts,  mountains,  urban  areas,  etc.)  and  using  widely  diversified  instruments  (standards, 
information, tax measures, transfers, investment choices in infrastructure, etc.) (IPCC, 2007).   
The aim of this report is to provide an overall economic framework that will help 
decision-makers  in  the  public  and  private  sectors  to  establish  effective  adaptation 
strategies.  It  is  assumed  in  this  report,  with  the  exception  of  particular  situations,  that 
adaptation  actions  raise  similar  questions  and  present  common  characteristics  that  lead  to 
recommendations applicable to a wide range of situations.  It is obvious that this report does not 
intend to replace detailed economic analyses of each specific adaptation problem.  For example, 
it  does  not  examine  financing  sources  for  adaptation  measures  and  only  identifies  the 
distribution  problems  that  could  arise  from  this  financing.  In  contrast,  it  provides  the 
methodological bases for the preparation of detailed analyses of adaptation problems.  
                                                       
1 Since the middle of the years 2000, we have observed a large number of initiatives related to adaptation 
to climate change, at the level of local government (many communities have adopted climate change 
plans that include both mitigation and adaptation), business (i.e., in the engineering and energy sectors), 
and the professional sectors (i.e., insurance and forestry). 
2 Even if greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were completely stopped today, the climate will nevertheless 
continue to change because of the inertia of the climate system.  If GHG emissions continue, it is likely 
that the climate will undergo additional changes whose amplitude will, on the other hand, depend on the 
level of emissions and, therefore, on the success or failure of international mitigation policies.   
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The report is divided into five sections.  The first three sections deal with the different 
aspects of the problem raised by adaptation in terms of public policy-making, and the following 
two, of a more methodological nature, address the issue of economic assessment of adaptation 
measures and the construction of a national strategy.  
Section  1  establishes  the  methodological  framework  of  the  report  by  defining 
adaptation and by describing its main characteristics.   
Section 2 is devoted to the role and types of public action in a world where the benefits 
of adaptation actions are mainly private, and where, as a result, the legitimacy of public 
intervention is not always obvious.  Public intervention can even have perverse effects if it 
incites agents to adopt more risky behaviors (what economists refer to as "moral hazard").  This 
section  lays  out  the  circumstances  in  which  public  intervention  in  relation  to  adaptation  is 
desirable or necessary and takes a look the different instruments that public authorities may use 
for this purpose. Finally, it gives some examples of applications for the different sectors.       
Section  3  is  devoted  to  the  spatial  and  territorial  aspect  of  adaptation  whose 
implementation cannot be the result of the simple juxtaposition of sectorial measures alone.  
This section deals with the long-term impact of climate change on the spatial distribution of 
activities and people, which has large indirect global impacts through changes in the functioning 
of markets and migratory flows. Consequently, the section addresses adaptation issues at the 
international level and the questions that they raise, particularly that of the "additionality" of 
resources devoted to adaptation. 
Section 4 proposes a method for building an adaptation strategy at the national level in 
the absence of a unique metrics to compare the performance of different solutions. This 
seven-stage process begins with the broad identification of a set of possible adaptation measures 
that is then reduced by identifying the most urgent measures – those resulting from imminent 
impacts  or  concerning  choices  to  be  made  today  but  that  will  have  very  long-term 
consequences. 
Finally,  Section  5  examines  the  different  possible  approaches  for  economically 
assessing adaptation measures within a framework of uncertainty on the future impact of 
climate change. It particularly shows how cost-benefit analysis (private or public) can be used 
to size each measure and to facilitate the allocation of resources between competing measures. 
The first version of this report was drawn up at the request of the Economic Council 
on  Sustainable  Development  (CEDD)  of  the  French  Ministry  of  Ecology,  Energy, 
Sustainable  Development  and  the  Sea 
(3),  within  the  national  consultation  to  design  an 
integrated national adaptation plan that should be published in 2011.  The economic framework 
proposed  by  the  report  appears  however  to  be  sufficiently  generic  to  be  of  interest  to 
government agencies and private experts worldwide.  It is for this reason that we have provided 
an English version. With respect to the initial version, the content is comparable, but examples 
and illustrations have been modified to provide a more global point of view. 
   
                                                       
3  The  first  version  of  the  report,  in  French,  can  be  found  at  http://developpement-
durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/001-3.pdf.   
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1.  What does adaptation to climate change mean?    
This  section  proposes  a  general  definition  of  adaptation  (  1.1).  It  then  focuses  on  four 
characteristics that determine its implementation (  1.2) and gives a few orders of magnitude of 
the costs of adaptation (  1.3). 
1.1.  A general definition of adaptation 
We can define adaptation to climate change as "the set of organization, localization and 
technical  changes  that  societies  will  have  to  implement  to  limit  the  negative  effects  of 
climate change and to maximize the beneficial ones" 
(4). Possible adaptation actions include, 
for  example,  removing  populations  and  assets  from  areas  at  risk  of  flooding  as a  result  of 
climate  change,  adopting  crop  varieties that  are more  resistant  and  better adapted  to  future 
climates, or adjusting energy networks to expected variations in energy consumption.   
According to Smit et al. (2000), two types of adaptation can be distinguished. Reactive 
adaptation consists of reacting ex post to adverse impacts of climate change when they occur. 
In contrast, anticipatory adaptation consists of taking action before impacts occur to reduce 
vulnerability to these impacts and to limit adverse consequences or to take advantage of them.  
For example, evacuating people from a flooded zone and relocating them in a safe zone is 
considered to be reactive adaption, whereas changing the land-use plan in anticipation of future 
flooding is considered to be anticipatory adaptation.     
Even  though  it  may  be  evident  from  an  intuitive  point  of  view,  the  line  between 
anticipatory adaptation and reactive adaptation is sometimes not that clear. For example, 
the Climate Plan adopted in France after the 2003 heat wave can be interpreted as a reaction to 
the 2003 event, as well as a way to anticipate similar (climate-change related) events in the 
future. 
The distinction between reactive adaptation and anticipatory adaptation is nevertheless very 
important in terms of public policies because the motivations for these two types of adaptation 
are different.  Anticipatory adaption (like mitigation) uses resources that exist today to prevent 
possible crises in the future or to take advantage of climate changes.  On the other hand, reactive 
adaptation uses resources to deal with events at the time they occur.  Practically speaking, 
political policy decisions are often easier to make after a crisis.  However, the cost of 
preventive actions is often much lower than the cost of reactive actions 
(5). 
1.2.  Uncertainty, dynamics, inertia and bifurcations: four major issues for 
adaptation strategies  
One  of  the  main  difficulties  for  developing  adaptation  strategies  is  dealing  with 
uncertainty.  This uncertainty is the sum of three components:   
  Uncertainty about the global scenario of climate change. The impacts of climate 
change and their associated risks are not comparable depending on whether we choose a 
scenario in which anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and climate sensitivity 
                                                       
4  Techniques aimed  at artificially  reducing climate change  through an additional intervention  on the 
climate ("geo-engineering") are not included within the scope of this report.    
5 For example, a warning system would have probably made it possible to considerably limit the loss of 
human lives linked to the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean (Athukorala and  Resosudarmo, 2005), but 
this type of system was only set up after the event.  In the same way, in a comparative analysis, Hallegatte 
(2010) shows that the purely reactive risk management in New Orleans leads to increasingly serious and 
costly catastrophes, whereas proactive risk management in Holland has made it possible to manage risks 
for more than a half century.   
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lead to an average temperature increase of +2°C or one of +4°C. It would be dangerous 
to plan to only one of these two scenarios today. Taking the 2°C scenario, we run the 
risk of putting off taking the measures necessary to deal with the impacts of a 4°C 
scenario until it is too late.  Taking the 4°C scenario, we run the risk of overinvesting in 
adaptation actions and therefore wasting scarce resources. 
  Uncertainty how global scenarios will translate at the local level. For example, even 
for  a  given  amount  of  global  warming  (measured  as  a  change  in  global  mean 
temperature), climate models diverge on the way in which climate change will affect the 
frequency and intensity of storm events in the north of Europe. Similarly, half of the 
climate  models  project  an  increase  in  precipitation  in  West  Africa;  the  other  half 
projects the opposite.  Uncertainty is therefore exacerbated when we have to assess the 
local impacts of climate change to establish an adaptation strategy.  Moreover, local 
climate changes are obscured by natural variability, making it particularly difficult to 
detect them. 
  Uncertainty  about  the  reaction  of  major  cycles  (e.g.,  water),  ecosystems  and 
societies to global and local climate changes. The response of ecosystems and human 
communities to changes in local climates is also extremely uncertain, but it influences 
what is an effective adaptation strategy. For example, the ability of coral reefs to cope 
with sea water warming, seal level rise and ocean acidification is highly uncertainty, but 
relevant adaptation options for small islands depend strongly on this issue. Adaptation 
strategy design needs to include this uncertainty from the earliest stages.  
As we will see below, the most effective method for taking this uncertainly into account is 
to  ensure  that  economic  stakeholders  have  the  best  information  possible  on  the  impacts  of 
climate  change  and  to  encourage  approaches  that  maintain  flexibility  for  future  action  as 
additional information becomes available.   
A second specificity of adaptation is its dynamic character.  Adaptation is not a specific 
action, aimed at going from a stable situation to a new one that is different but stable as well.  
On the contrary, societies will have to adjust to a climate that will change at a sustained rate for 
centuries to come 
(6).  The challenge is therefore to know how and at what price we can 
adapt our life styles and our economic system to a "perpetually changing" climate. To 
address this challenge, it is important to consider adaptation as a basically long-term transitory 
process.  In other words, an adaptation plan for several years would only be part of a very long-
term plan (see Section 4). 
A third important characteristic to be considered is the inertia of our socio-economic 
systems. The uncertainty and the dynamic character of adaptation would be easier to take into 
account if it was possible to correct easily adaptation trajectories.  However, many sectors have 
a high degree of inertia that forces us to make choices with long-term and even very long-term 
consequences.  The time scales of several economic sectors like the forestry sector or those with 
heavy infrastructure (housing and urbanism, energy production, flood management, etc.) are 
therefore of the same order of magnitude than the time scale for climate change.  Decisions 
concerning  the  localization  of  assets  have  particularly  long  time  horizons  that  considerably 
exceed the lifespan of the installed capital.  Moreover, it cannot be forgotten that inertia is not 
just technical, and institutional: regulatory and even cultural inertias must be taken into account.  
The socio-economic inertia that results from all of these mechanisms has three consequences:     
  Defining adaptation measures becomes more complex because it is necessary to 
take action very far ahead of time.  For example, a building built in 2000 with a 
lifespan of 150 years (typical for Paris) should be adapted to the current climate in Paris 
as well as the climate in 2160, which will probably be very different from the climate 
                                                       
6 Past greenhouse emissions are sufficient to increase sea levels over several millenniums.   
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today.  However,  it  is  more  complicated  to  build  a  building  (or  any  type  of 
infrastructure) adapted to a wide range of climates rather than a specific, stable, well-
known climate.  We must therefore either build buildings adapted to a narrow climate 
range and that are therefore less costly, but whose operational lifespan may be reduced 
(for example, it could be necessary to tear down and rebuild the buildings in 2050, 
whereas they are still in good condition), or to take varied climates into consideration in 
the construction with a potentially longer operational lifespan, but at a much higher 
cost.  
  The combination of uncertainty on climate change and of the long asset lifespan 
leads to the risk of maladaptation (see Box n°1). Maladaptation is not just related to 
the future climate.  In fact, our societies are not necessarily adapted to today's climate.  
This current maladaptation is often referred to as an "adaptation deficit." For example, 
major investments have recently been made in many countries in areas that are flood-
prone  even  in  the  absence  of  climate  change.  Climate  change  adaptation  must  not 
necessarily aim at maintaining the current risk level that we may consider to be too 
high.  When the current situation can be qualified as sub-optimal, an adaptation plan 
may include measures that would be desirable, even without climate change – often 
qualified as the "reduction of the current adaptation deficit" – as well as measures that 
can only be justified because there is a climate change – and that constitute adaptation 
in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word  (this  question  is  also  addressed  in  Box  n°4  on  the 
definition of adaptation costs).    
  Adaptation and climate change time scales are too long for us to be able to learn 
much from experience or to learn by doing, at least on the short-term 
(7).  
 A fourth difficulty for developing adaptation strategies is related to the fact that in many 
cases, it is too costly or technically impossible to adapt "at the margin" while maintaining 
the same activities or services under a new climate.  Adapting to climate change therefore 
may  require  "bifurcations"  towards  new  activities  and/or  towards  new  locations.  For 
example, it is likely that low and medium-altitude winter sports resorts will no longer be able to 
provide ski activities at some point in the future and it might be underoptimal trying to preserve 
these activities at high cost (see Box n°2).  To be able to foresee these types of bifurcations, 
adaptation policies must be developed within an intersectoral framework where overall land-use 
development  is  taken  into  consideration.    Moreover,  experience  shows  that  such  economic 
bifurcations often involve difficult problems, in particular in terms of employment, and are 
difficult to trigger and drive. 
1.3.  Assessment of the global costs of adapting to climate change  
The cost of adapting to climate change is the sum of investment costs and operating 
costs  linked  to  the  establishment  of  adaptation  strategies.    It  is  important  to  note  that 
adaptation  will  not  be  able  to  completely  expunge  the  impacts  of  climate  change.  
Consequently, the global cost of climate change will be the result of adaptation costs plus the 
cost of residual impacts after adaptation measures are put in place.  The aim of a successful 
adaptation strategy is therefore to find a satisfactory time and space distribution of adaptation 
expenses that minimizes this global cost over time.  
 
                                                       
7  In  contrast,  we  can  use  "climatic  analogs"  to  help  us  reason  intelligently.  Within  this  context, 
development experiences in sub-tropical and tropical countries are particularly interesting for countries 
with temperate climates.   
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Box n°1: The concept of "maladaptation" 
Measures designed to adapt to the effects of climate change can lead to results that are not 
consistent  with  expectations,  and  "maladaptation  risks"  should  not  be  underestimated.  
Maladaptation is defined by the IPCC (the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) as "a 
change  in  natural  or  human  systems  that  leads  to  an  increase  rather  than  a  decrease  in 
vulnerability." 
A  maladaptation  situation  may  arise,  for  example,  after  a  calibration  error,  i.e.,  a  poor 
calibration of adaptation measures following an inaccurate prognosis of the nature or extent of 
future  changes  or  an  inadequate  response  to  this  prognosis.  It  may  also  occur  when  an 
adaptation measure leads to the transfer of the vulnerability of one system to another, or one 
period to another (a measure may be positive for one period and then negative for another, or 
vice versa). 
A distinction must be made between two sources of maladaptation.  First, a maladaptation 
situation ex post can result in entirely appropriate decisions based on information available ex 
ante. As a result of the uncertainty of the impacts of climate change, the analysis ex ante often 
only makes it possible to limit the range of adaptation choices possible without limiting it to a 
specific choice.  The choice of the measure to be taken among the set of measures compatible 
with the information available ex ante on climate change will then be a sort of wager on the part 
of society (see Section 5).  For example, it may appear desirable today to better regulate new 
construction in low coastal zones.  However, if we realize in 2050 that the most optimistic 
scenario on the rise in sea levels was the right one, this adaptation measure could then appear to 
be inadequate, even if it is (and remains) desirable today.  This type of maladaptation cannot be 
avoided and can only be regretted ex post if all of the information available was not used ex 
ante. 
On the other hand, a maladaptation situation can also arise from a "poor choice" ex ante, i.e., 
inadequate  consideration  of  the  information  available.  This  is  the  case,  for  example,  if 
adaptation measures are established in view of a unique climate scenario, without including 
uncertainty, or even if advanced signs of local climate change were not detected early enough 
by  stakeholders.  This  type  of  maladaptation  can  lead  to  regrets  ex  post  since  all  of  the 
information available was not used to its best advantage ex ante.  This type of situation could be 
avoided if the methodologies for the development of adaptation strategies are well designed and 
satisfactorily implemented.  
Reducing the risk of maladaptation is possible, in particular, by giving priority (i) to "no-
risk" strategies that reduce the vulnerability of climate change while both reaping immediate co-
benefits and maintaining a degree of efficiency independently of which climate change scenario 
reveals correct; or (ii) to "flexible" or "reversible" strategies that can be easily modified as new 
information becomes available.  
 
Several studies (see Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008, for a review) attempt to assess the 
cost of adaptation measures, particularly in the infrastructure sector.  They are based on two 
distinct  methodologies:  (1)  "top-down"  approaches,  based  on  sums  invested  every  year  in 
sectors  sensitive  to  climate  conditions,  and  that  assume  that  climate  change  will  lead  to 
additional costs (on the order of 10%) on these investments, and (2) "bottom-up" approaches 
that attempt to identify and assess the investments necessary in each of the sectors concerned 
(protection of coasts, water, agriculture, etc.).  
"Top-down" estimates of the Word Bank (2006) and the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP, 2007) assess adaptation costs at between 9 and 109 billon dollars per year for 
developing countries.  The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC, 2007) proposes an assessment of 49 to 171 billion dollars per year for all countries.    
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A more recent World Bank analysis (World Bank, 2009) concludes that the cost of developing 
countries to adapt to climate change between 2010 and 2050 can be estimated at US$70 billion 
to US$100 billion a year. These estimates must be taken with a great deal of precaution given 
the simplicity of the methods used, which emphasize investment costs but neglect operating 
costs, and because of the difficulty in accounting for the “adaptation deficit”, i.e., the inadequate 
adaptation to the current climate conditions (see Parry et al., 2009). 
"Bottom-up" estimates are based on different methodologies depending on the sector being 
considered and on hypotheses that are not necessarily consistent with each other.  This makes it 
difficult to pool their results in order to calculate the cost of adaptation at the global or national 
level.  We can nevertheless observe that this type of analysis generally assumes adaptation costs 
that are less than those of estimates of top-down studies.   
We can also add that these studies provide very little information about the distribution 
of these costs between public budgets, producers and consumers, whereas the effectiveness 
of an adaptation strategy involves not only a realistic estimate of adaptation costs but of the 
capacity to distribute them among the different private and public stakeholders as well.       
2.  Role and types of public actions with respect to adaptation  
This section examines the reasons that justify public intervention with respect to adaptation 
from a theoretical point of view (  2.1), takes a look at the different types of instruments to be 
considered (  2.2), and then gives some examples of applications for the major sectors concerned 
(  2.3).  
2.1.  Justifying public intervention en terms of adaptation    
As mentioned above, mitigation reduces risks linked to climate change, both known and 
unknown, and regardless of location.  In economic terms, mitigation produces what is known 
as a public good 
(8).   Economic theory suggests that public goods are spontaneously produced 
in insufficient quantity, as it is in the interest of each economic actor to take advantage of a 
public good produced by others without having to make the effort himself.  From the point of 
view of economic theory, public action is therefore legitimate (and necessary) to ensure that the 
public good be produced at the socially optimal level.    
The case of adaptation is different.  Adaptation only reduces certain risk categories, most 
often in very specific geographic zones.  In economic terms, adaptation generally produces 
what is referred to as private goods.  For example, reinforcing a building so that it will be 
able to withstand bigger storms is only of benefit to the inhabitants of this building.  In certain 
cases, adaptation can also produce what is known as "club" goods or services, i.e., access to a 
seasonal forecasting system for a fee.  It can produce public goods, but ones that are most often 
related to a specific region or a specific sector, i.e., a seawall that indiscriminately protects all of 
the people who live behind it.  In this last case, the issue is less one of the public/private sharing 
of actions than that of the distribution of responsibilities between national and local public 
authorities.  
Economic theory suggests that in an ideal world, private goods would be produced by 
the individuals or firms that benefit from them, and not by governments.  For example, if an 
individual installs an air-conditioner in his home, he will take advantage of it during the next 
                                                       
8 In economic terms, a good is considered to be public if it is both non-rival (the fact that someone 
consumes it does not prevent others from consuming it) and non-exclusive (it is not possible to prevent 
someone from consuming this good).  Climate quality is typical of a public good since the fact that I can 
enjoy the climate does not prevent my neighbor from enjoying it as well, whereas it is impossible to 
prevent someone else from enjoying it.   
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heat wave.  In the same way, if a forester chooses species resistant to climate change today, his 
future heirs will benefit from this choice because they will have wood to sell.  
However,  circumstances  do  exist  in  which  the  private  production  of  adaptation  by 
households  or  firms  (sometimes  referred  to  as  "spontaneous  adaptation")  risks  being 
insufficient, and where public intervention for adaptation is justified from the point of view of 
economic theory for reasons of equity and/or efficiency.  The list that follows is adapted from 
Lecocq and Shalizi (2007). 
  Poor dissemination of available information: Experience suggests that information 
that exists on climate change, its impacts and on adaptation options is not available 
today in sufficiently large quantity, particularly in developing countries.  This creates 
asymmetrical situations in terms of information that  may lead, on the one hand, to 
maladaptation situations (see Box n°1) and, on the other, may stand in the way of good 
market operation, create location advantages and produce new inequalities (between 
and  within  countries).    Public  authorities  and  the  international  community  have  an 
important  role  to  play  in  this  case  in  the  production  of  information  (fundamental 
research, R&D) and in the dissemination of this information between countries and to 
households, firms and local communities within countries.  This point is developed in 
Section   2.2.1. 
  Barriers to collective action at the local level: Adaptation often requires considerable 
cooperation between actors at the local level for the provision of local public goods 
(irrigation networks, seawalls, etc.).  This is particularly true for the management of 
transborder resources such as large drainage basins.  Public action and international 
coordination  may  be  necessary  to  facilitate  negotiations  between  concerned 
stakeholders.  Coordination support may be provided, for example, by the setting of 
standards and norms (Section   2.2.2), as well as by an action on institutions (Section 
  2.2.3) such as the creation of discussion forums or national or international mediation 
activities. 
  Decision  routines  and  inadequate  consideration  of  long-term  consequences  on 
private investment decisions: Private investment decisions do not always adequately 
take  long  and  very  long-term  consequences into  account  (for  example,  future  snow 
conditions in medium-altitude ski resorts), which could justify public action.  In the 
same  way,  the  provision  of  basic  services  by  public  authorities  is  often  taken  for 
granted,  whereas  major  changes  in  climate  conditions  could  make  these  services 
impossible or too costly (for example, access to water for agriculture on the long-term).  
This could justify a public action to make it easier to address this new situation.  
  External impacts: Some adaptation actions are not profitable from the private point of 
view but may be for the community at large. For example, it may not be profitable for a 
homeowner  to  insulate  his  home  to  reduce  energy  consumption  linked  to  air-
conditioning,  whereas  the  collective  benefit  is  considerable  if  a  large  number  of 
homeowners do it.  In contrast, it may be profitable for a developer to build in a flood-
prone area, whereas the cost of flooding for the community is much greater (pressure on 
the  healthcare  system,  temporary  relocation  of  flood  victims,  etc.) 
(9).  An  optimal 
                                                       
9 Many other examples of external impacts linked to adaptation actions exist.  Concerning water, for 
example,  it  may  be  economically  viable  to  increase  irrigation  for  agriculture,  but  the  removal  of 
additional water could have negative effects on other stakeholders (particularly electricity producers) and 
on ecosystems.  Once again, in relation to water, upstream actions involving drainage basins, particularly 
at the transnational level, can positively or negatively influence the situation downstream.  In the area of 
energy,  the  massive  use  of  air-conditioning  or  the  desalination  of  seawater  can  increase  energy 
consumption and lead to tension between adaptation and mitigation.  In contrast, the reinforced insulation   
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action for a stakeholder may therefore have negative external impacts on other 
stakeholders and not correspond to the socially optimal action, thus requiring public 
action in order to avoid these effects induced ex ante, through, for example, standards, 
tax measures or institutions (Sections   0 and   2.2.3). 
  The role of major infrastructure networks for the public benefit: Among the assets 
to be protected from climate change are networks (rail, road, communication, energy, 
information, etc.) that can be considered as public goods (as well as high fixed costs).  
Protecting these networks from climate change is all the more important since they 
generate important returns for society by providing essential services such as energy, 
transportation and communications – services whose production must be ensured, even 
during crises.   In addition to standards that make it possible to influence private action 
in these sectors, adaptation also concerns public investment (Section   2.2.4). 
  Inadequacy of existing standards and regulations: Some economic sectors are highly 
regulated, to the point that stakeholders may not react to climate change since they only 
take  environmental  and  climatic  aspects  into  account  by  complying  with  fixed 
regulations and standards.  This is largely the case in the civil engineering sector, for 
example.    In  such  situations,  we  cannot  expect  spontaneous  adaptation  without 
additional incentives, and public action is therefore necessary for adaptation, either by 
modifying the standards and regulations so as to take climate change into account, or to 
delegate  adaptation  to  the  stakeholders  by  changing  regulatory  limits  so  that 
spontaneous adaptation becomes possible 
(10).  
  Poverty  and  budget  constraints:  The  preceding  interventions  are  related  to  the 
efficiency of resource allocation.  However, another major reason that justifies public 
intervention is equity. Some individuals, firms, local communities and even countries 
may be unable to afford adaptation measures themselves, even if these measures are in 
their own interest. Government (local, regional, national or international) may want to 
help  these  actors  through  transfer  mechanisms,  e.g.,  fiscal  (see  Section    2.2.2),  or 
international transfers.  
To sum up, despite the fact that adaptation yields mostly private or local public benefits, 
economic theory recognizes several scenarios in which public action is justified.  However, this 
is not always the case, and a case-by case analysis is necessary.  Government should therefore 
only support anticipative adaptation measures if the benefits to society outweigh the cost of 
their  implementation.    Public  cost-benefit  analysis  provides  a  framework  for  making  such 
assessments.  This tool is discussed in greater detail in Section 5.   
 
2.2.  Types of public action for adaptation 
The preceding discussion suggests four main types of public action in terms of adaptation: 
(1)  the  production  and  dissemination  of  information;  (2)  action  in  relation  to  standards, 
regulations and taxation; (3) action in relation to institutions; and (4) action in relation to public 
investment decisions.  Adaptation public action is therefore far from being reduced to large 
expenditures in capital or in infrastructure.  We will see, in fact, that some types of action can be 
effective at practically no cost.  
                                                                                                                                                             
of buildings that makes it possible to improve the comfort of dwellings in the event of extreme heat or to 
reduce heat consumption in winter is, on the contrary, an example of synergy between these objectives.    
10 Since standards are generally established to compensate for a lack of incentive, delegating adaptation to 
stakeholders can only be done by establishing adequate incentives.     
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This section  describes each type of action in detail.  It is general (the types of actions 
discussed above apply to local, national and transnational adaptation policies) and does not deal 
with  the  spatial  scale  of  the  governance  structures  the  most  effectively  adapted  to  the 
establishment  of  these  actions  since  they  are  context-specific  and  largely  dependent  on  the 
institutional  organization  of  the  territory  being  considered  as  well  as  the  result  of  specific 
collective choices, e.g., in terms of risk aversion or redistribution choices.      
2.2.1  Production and dissemination of information 
One  major  responsibility  of  public  authorities  concerns  the  production  and 
dissemination of information about climate changes, their impacts and how to adapt to 
them. Fundamental research is answerable to public action since the results of fundamental 
research  are  generally  public  goods.    Governments  have  many  means  to  encourage  the 
production of knowledge relevant to impact assessment and for adaptation, whether it be alone 
or  within  supranational  frameworks.    The  challenge  is  to  provide  a  sufficient  quantity  of 
fundamental research and useful technologies in time for adaptation to develop. 
Notwithstanding a survey, we can expect that the private sector will take charge of part of 
the R&D effort concerning technical innovations as soon as it is able to reap some of the 
resulting benefits (for example, by developing and then marketing plant varieties more resistant 
to drought).  The issue for the national and international community will be, if applicable, to 
identify areas where important society-related adaptation technologies would not be developed 
by private innovation 
(11).  A related issue will be to arbitrate between support for innovation in 
the private sector (objective: economic development) and the transfer of adaptation technologies 
towards stakeholders and countries that themselves do not have the means to obtain them on the 
market (objective: solidarity and development aid).  
Second,  public  authorities  must  ensure  the  dissemination  of  information  on  the 
impacts  of  climate  change  and  on  ways  to  adapt  to  it.    The  difficulty  here  is  that  this 
information is compartmental, controversial and constantly changing with scientific progress.  
Even though it is available in scientific publications, it is quite costly to organize and format in 
a language that can be used by decision-makers.  In France, a specific institution, the ONERC or 
French  National  Observatory  of  the  Effects  of  Global  Warming,  has  been  responsible  for 
making  this  information  accessible  since  its  creation.    In  the  United  Kingdom,  the  UKCIP 
program  handles  both  research  and  accessibility  of  information  to  businesses,  regional 
government agencies and households.  It is obvious that many developing countries cannot 
devote  the  same  efforts  to  these  issues,  and  support  for  the  international  dissemination  of 
information is therefore of utmost importance. This issue is discussed at the international level, 
i.e., though the Global Framework for Climate Services, established within the framework of 
the World Meteorological Organization.  
Nevertheless, the information necessary will be very different depending on the regions 
and sectors considered.  Within this context, a complementarity between the public sector 
and the private sector should be established. The first should disseminate general information 
on climate scenarios, impacts and adaptation at a minimal cost since this information can be 
considered as a public good.  The second (with the eventual collaboration of public institutions) 
could provide more detailed analyses by region or by sector, since these analyses require a 
specific effort and have a significant marginal cost. This hypothetical situation, however, raises 
several  questions.    First  of  all,  this  detailed  information  must  remain  accessible  to  local 
stakeholders  with  less  ample  means  –  which  could  require  the  implementation  of  specific 
measures  (e.g.,  subsidies).    A  second  issue  concerns  the  validation  and  verification  of  the 
                                                       
11 We can make an  analogy with the under-investment of pharmaceutical firms in the  battle against 
malaria – highly prevalent worldwide – relative to their investment in the fight against other diseases that 
are more prevalent in high-income countries.       
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quality  of  information  distributed,  within  a  context  where  the  time  scales  involved  do  not 
always allow for feedback in terms of experience or the reputations of producers of poor-quality 
information.    Box  n°2  gives  an  example  of  the  strategic  role  of  information  for  making 
decisions in the case of private stakeholders.    
Box n°2: The impact of information on competitive conditions: the case of ski resort 
operators  
The  OECD  has  studied  the  link  between  global  warming  and  winter  sports  (Agrawala, 
2007), revealing the importance of the role of information on market operation and competitive 
conditions between stakeholders.  
There are currently 660 ski resorts in the Alps, with revenues that make it the number one 
economic activity in the region.  However, this environment is particularly sensitive to global 
warming: the Alps are one of the areas of Europe where the temperature is increasing the most 
rapidly.  Historical series show that the temperature increase in this region was more than 50% 
greater on the average than the global warming average worldwide over the past 40 years.  To 
adapt to global warming, ski resort operators are therefore confronted with a double uncertainty: 
(i) the overall global scenario, and (ii) its transposition to local conditions with a very high 
probability of a global scenario with a rise of 2°C, which translates into a rise of over 3°C above 
the ski slopes.  
A recurrent snow shortage has caused problems in 60 of the resorts.  If the temperature rises 
by an average of 2°C over the next decades, the OECD estimates that some 100 additional 
resorts will suffer from a lack of snow.  If it rises by 4°C, only 200 resorts will be able to 
operate – those located above 2,000 meters.  
These  resorts  spontaneously  turn  to  the  production  of  artificial  snow.    This  type  of 
spontaneous  adaptation  increases  the  amount  of  energy  used,  upping  operating  costs  and 
emitting greenhouse gases.  It requires water – over 10 million m
3 each winter in France – 
representing a considerable cost.  And then there is the prime ingredient for the snow cannons to 
work: cold.  When the thermometer refuses to go any lower, the snow cannons remain idle and 
the skiers have to go to slopes at higher altitudes or revert to hiking.  The return on investments 
made in the name of adaptation is therefore the inverse function of the seriousness of the impact 
that it is supposed to correct.  
From an economic point of view, the impact of global warming on operating conditions in 
ski resorts in the Alps can be analyzed as a loss for the sector in general.  In the beginning, it 
takes on the form of an increase in production costs.  It then represents a loss in capital with the 
likely closing of low and medium-altitude resorts.  However, it is important to note that this loss 
modifies the competition, creating winners and losers.   
Overall sector losses will be the result of multiple adjustments between certain stakeholders 
who  will  take  advantage  of  the  situation  and others  who  will  be  weakened  and  sometimes 
doomed to disappear. Competition rules will be modified: the future of operators specialized in 
medium-altitude resorts that cannot re-orient their activities will be compromised; operators 
specialized in higher altitude resorts will, in contrast, benefit from the shift in clientele and cost-
related advantages.  If we study the structure of the sector, we can see that a limited number of 
operators intervene in several areas and specialize in high-altitude resorts, especially the largest 
ones like the Compagnie des Alpes, traded on the Paris stock exchange, that recently refocused 
its  investment  strategies  on  high-altitude  ski  resorts  because  of  global  warming.  Low  and 
medium-altitude ski resort operators are currently being abandoned by the major operators.  
Past  information  dissymmetries  have  made  it  possible  for  some  of  the  better-informed 
stakeholders in the sector to make high-altitude investments that will allow them to benefit from 
a comparative advantage over other operators in the sector for several decades. In light of the 
consequences for the entire region, given that a large part of the population lives off of winter   
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tourism, these questions are not only relevant for private actors, but they require a more in-depth 
public reflection.  
A third important type of public action deals with the detection of early warning signs 
of climate change. In light of the temporal inertias described above, it is important that all of 
the information that can be drawn from the observation of local impacts on climate change be 
interpreted as rapidly as possible in order to expand the shared body of knowledge on climate 
change impacts.  This detection of early warning signs requires adapted institutions (see Section 
  2.2.3). 
2.2.2  Adaptation of standards, regulations and tax measures     
The  adaptation  of  existing  standards  and  regulations  in  relation  to  future  climate 
changes is an obvious enough requirement for everything that concerns adaptation of long-term 
fixed capital (buildings, infrastructure, transportation, civil engineering works, etc.).  However, 
revising public standards in view of climate risks is an issue that concerns many other economic 
sectors. 
Concerning long-term fixed capital, the government typically fixes (implicitly or explicitly) 
the acceptable risk level, via, for example, dimensional standards for civil engineering works, 
standards related to new constructions 
(12), or by limiting constructible areas.  These standards 
are  generally  based  on  the  past  frequency  of  natural  disasters,  frequencies  that  no  longer 
correspond to the present risk and still less to future ones.  In the case of building standards in 
civil engineering, for example, regulations generally indicate the expected level of resistance for 
the stakeholders, most often calculated using historical data 
(13).  With climate change, these 
standards must evolve.  Two solutions can be considered.  In the first solution, the public sector 
establishes a procedure for updating the standard on a regular basis so that it is always up-to-
date.  In the second solution, the public sector delegates this job to economic stakeholders by 
establishing standards that "follow" (or "precede") the climate.  For example, in relation to civil 
engineering structures, the public authorities can require the capacity to resist 100-year floods as 
a standard, without specifying the level of this flood, leaving this to the economic actors.  In 
reality, this would require the government to develop procedural standards to ensure that this 
risk analysis is carried out correctly, as was done with a varying degree of success for prudential 
regulations in the financial sector 
(14).  
In addition to technical standards stricto sensu, it may be necessary to adapt procedural 
standards, e.g., making a vulnerability/robustness study in view of climate change mandatory 
for  public  and  private  civil  engineering  works 
(15).    From  a  more  general  point  of  view, 
facilitating adaptation may also involve the modification of other standards not directly linked 
to climate risks but that have an impact on adaptability. In the case of long-term fixed 
capital, architectural and  development standards therefore play a critical role.  In Paris, for 
example,  window  shutters  were  forbidden  for  30  years  in  the  name  of  urban  landscape 
protection.  Likewise, overly restrictive regulations related to open spaces can discourage tree 
planting in cities, essential for dealing with steep rises in temperature.  By examining possible 
changes in these standards, decision-makers (local as well as national) face the challenge of 
distinguishing between the aim of facilitating adaptation to climate change and other objectives 
                                                       
12 These standards make it necessary to establish a link with other policy objectives like, for example, 
those related to the reduction of energy consumption in the building sector.  
13 Since this information is similar to a public good, it is justified for the government to distribute it freely 
(see Section   2.2.1). 
14 Since the Basel II accords, financial regulators have delegated the responsibility of proposing risk 
models to private actors.  This type of regulation is now being extended to insurers (Solvency2). 
15  The World Bank, the French Deve lopment Agency and most of the other bilateral development 
agencies are developing procedures to tests for climate change vulnerability into their project cycles for 
projects that involve long-term capital (particularly infrastructure).     
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to  which  these  standards  correspond,  such  as  the  protection  of  urban  landscapes  or  risk 
management linked to open spaces.  
Finally, we cannot overlook the existence of implicit routines, habits and standards that 
influence the operation of organizations, firms and households.  These routines and standards 
cannot  be  modified  upon  a  simple  decision.    On  the  contrary,  their  evolution  will  require 
different  actions  in  terms  of  information  dissemination  and  education  (particularly  within 
professional  development).    In  some  cases,  these  standards  and  habits  are highly  inert.    In 
others, they can be extremely rapidly modified, like in the case of smoking in public places.  In 
addition  to  public  standards,  other  economic  instruments  such  as  taxation  may  motivate 
economic agents to modify their routines.  For example, regulations concerning the property tax 
system have  a particular importance since they can lead to different types of land use and 
different levels of natural risk exposure.     
2.2.3  Adaptation of institutions 
A  third  type  of  public  adaptation  measure  concerns  institutions.  The  typology 
established by the 2003 World Development Report of the World Bank attributes three essential 
functions to institutions within the context of environmental change: identifying early warning 
signs of changes and crises, balancing the interests of the different stakeholders, and being 
capable of credibly implementing the solutions it proposes (World Bank, 2003). 
Identification of the early warning signs of the impacts of climate change has already 
been discussed in the section concerning information processing.  It is of utmost importance 
since the earlier these signs are identified, the wider the panel of adaptation measures available 
to the community will be.  Within this context, it is necessary to verify, on the one hand, that 
existing institutions do a good job of collecting relevant information to identify the signs linked 
to climate change, and on the other, that this information is cross-referenced and processed in 
time to provide ample warning that can be put to good use.  If necessary, particularly at the 
regional  level,  new  institutions  or  new  arrangements  can  be  created.    New  information 
technologies provide tools at this time to carry out these operations, e.g., via satellite imaging or 
the creation of decentralized systems to monitor the state of ecosystems, inspired by the medical 
monitoring network model, in order to provide additional support for existing institutions.  
The ability to produce well-balanced arrangements is critical since existing institutions 
may be subject to increasing pressures as a result of climate change. For example, water 
distribution  among  users  may  become  even  more  conflictual  in  the  future  than  it  is  today.  
Similarly, the impacts of climate change may create tensions between public-private partners 
(PPPs) as a result of the emergence of unforeseen risks in the initial arrangement 
(16).  Within 
this context, it may prove necessary to review existing institutional arrangements, or even to 
create new ones.  For example, by exacerbating tensions between supply and demand on the 
electrical  power  grid,  climate  change  may  require  a  greater  degree  of  cooperation  between 
European stakeholders in the sector. 
The credibility of arrangements and  the ability of institutions to enforce  them  is a 
general problem that is not specific to adaptation to climate change.  In contrast, given that a 
high degree of uncertainty exists about climate change damages and the fact that information is 
rapidly  increasing,  arrangements  must  be  sufficiently  flexible  to  be  able  to  adapt  to  new 
circumstances if they are to be sustainable.  The definition of "adaptive" standards (see the 
preceding section) is an example of the way in which this flexibility can be integrated into 
                                                       
16 In this case, the literature emphasizes the importance of the flexibility of contracts to allow beneficial 
re-negotiations for both parties in the event of a change in circumstances (see e.g., Cochran (2009) for the 
case of transportation infrastructure).  However, we must also be careful not to allow climate change to 
become a pretext for opportunistic re-negotiation demands on the part of firms, a frequent problem in 
public-private partnerships (PPP) (Irwin, 2007).    
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contractual arrangements.  Introducing geographically flexible elements is, in particular, a major 
challenge within the framework of climate change.  Here once again, particular attention must 
be paid to moral hazard issues if the government agrees to help some stakeholders with their 
adaptation in the event of a very negative impact. It is crucial not to create perverse incentives 
that would encourage stakeholders not to anticipate their adaptation and to use the impacts to 
justify public aid.  
Institutional measures must play an important role in all adaptation strategies. This 
can be illustrated by a comparative analysis of the reaction of Louisiana and the Netherlands to 
the local rise in sea level of 50 and 20 cm, respectively, during the 20
th century (Hallegatte, 
2010).  Holland's successful strategy since 1953 is due more to the establishment of institutions 
necessary for risk management (the Delta Commission) than to the implementation of technical 
measures  (seawalls,  etc.).    These  institutions  actually  guaranteed  risk  management  and  the 
reinforcement of protective measures on a regular basis, instead of management on a case-by-
case basis, consisting of reinforcing seawalls after each disaster, as observed in Louisiana.  
To  ensure  that  institutions  play  their  role  in  the  adaptation  to  climate  change,  an 
essential prerequisite is to precisely define responsibilities.   Although adaptation will be of 
concern to a large number of existing organizations and institutions, responsibility for it will not 
necessarily be automatic or planned.  We must therefore make sure that contradictory initiatives 
are not taken by several organizations that decide to tackle adaptation to climate change without 
consulting  other  organizations  beforehand,  and  that  certain  issues  are  simply  not  addressed 
because one of the possible stakeholders did not do so.  This question is particularly sensitive in 
relation to the definition of relevant spatial scales.  Whereas adaptation implies territorial policy 
choices that must certainly be defined at the local scale, it also requires coordination between 
territories to avoid costly incoherencies.  The implementation of effective adaptation strategies 
will therefore depend on the mobilization of existing institutions and their competencies, as well 
as on coordination tools that will make it possible to take advantage of sectorial or regional 
initiatives, while avoiding contradictions and inconsistencies.       
Another area in which institutions should adapt is that of crisis management (reactive 
adaptation). In the event of a disaster or crisis, an emergency response often requires means 
beyond those of the region or country hit.  It is therefore useful to pool these emergency means, 
as European countries do, for example, to fight forest fires.  The same problem arises during 
reconstruction  since  the  lack  of  capacity  sometimes  leads  to  an  increase  in  prices  and  a 
slowdown in reconstruction (as was observed with the 2004  and 2005 hurricane seasons in 
Florida,  or  after  Katrina  in  Louisiana;  see  Hallegatte,  2008).  At  this  stage,  it  is  sometimes 
possible  to  take  advantage  of  reconstruction  to  improve  the  situation,  i.e.,  by  improving 
transportation networks or the quality of buildings instead of rebuilding the same ones (which is 
done in the large majority of cases).  However, this presupposes that reconstruction actors have 
the  resources  necessary  for  "intelligent"  reconstruction  and  the  time  to  implement  it,  often 
without  the  income  from  their  normal  activity  that  was  interrupted  by  the  disaster.    These 
financial resources can be provided by an effective insurance fund or through targeted public aid 
(17).  Adapting crisis management systems is one of the "no regret" measures that contribute to 
adaptation to climate change since they can generally be justified by existing natural risks, even 
in the absence of climate change.     
                                                       
17 We can imagine specific funds to help countries hit by a disaster, on the model of the European Union 
Solidarity Fund, or the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF).  We can also imagine 
more general types of mechanisms such as "rainy day funds", i.e., special public funds where excess 
revenue is set aside when available for use in times of unexpected revenue shortfall or budget deficit 
(Lecocq  and  Shalizi,  2007).    These  funds  exist  in  several  states  in  the  US  and  in  some  developing 
countries.     
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2.2.4  Adaptation of public investments 
For central and local governments, the three types of actions described above consisted 
in creating an adequate environment to enable and promote private adaptation. However, 
central and local governments are also directly involved in adaptation in their role as owners 
and operators of long-term fixed capital (buildings, infrastructure, etc.), as well as in their role 
of ecosystem manager, employer, etc.  A fourth type of public measure in view of climate 
change therefore deals with the adaptation of existing public infrastructure (transportation 
networks for passengers, merchandise and energy, telecom networks, etc.), as well as public 
buildings in general.  New investments must also be adapted, e.g., in terms of size and location.  
More generally, this type of action covers policies that structure land use, whether it be for 
urbanism policies, major investments (transportation of goods and merchandise, water transport, 
etc.),  regional  economic  development  projects,  etc.    In  the  end,  the  question  of  relocating 
activities and populations will also arise (see Section   2.3.2).  
2.3.  Examples of possible adaptation measures in several major sectors   
Public action in relation to adaptation to climate change covers some new  and specific 
actions such as access to information on climate scenarios or a compendium of climate change 
warning signs.  However, we have already seen that the majority of public actions targeted at 
adaptation consist of modifying public policies so that climate change is correctly taken into 
consideration in the decisions of public and private stakeholders in each economic sector. The 
aim of this section is to illustrate the major categories of adaptation measures described 
above using sectorial examples.  It must be remembered that these are only examples and that 
this section in no way aims at being exhaustive. First, many sectors are not examined here. 
Second, the discussion within each sector focuses on only several examples.   A specific study 
would  be  necessary  to  identify  and  validate  possible  adaptation  measures  and  to  build  an 
adaptation strategy for each of the sectors considered.  
2.3.1  Construction and urbanism 
To illustrate the influence of inertia and uncertainty on investment decisions, it is interesting 
to  focus  on  sectors  with  very  long-term  capital.  These  sectors  include  building  and  urban 
infrastructure  that  are  discussed  in  this  section,  as  well  as  the  energy  sector  and  that  of 
transportation that are presented in the following section.  In these sectors, capital  – whose 
lifespan is on the same order of magnitude as the climate change time scale – must remain 
productive despite a climate that will undergo considerable change.  This challenge does not 
only  concern  new  investments  but  also,  and  above  all,  a  large  part  of  the  structures  and 
infrastructure already installed that intend to remain productive for several decades to come.  
As  mentioned  above,  the  very  long  lifespan  of  capital  complicates  the  definition  of 
adaptation measures.  Thus, a building built in 2000 with a lifespan of 150 years should be 
adapted to the current climate in Paris, as well as to the climate in Paris in 2150, which will 
probably be very different from the climate today.  We know how to build buildings adapted to 
different  climates,  but  it  is  more  complex  to  build  a  building  (or  any  other  infrastructure) 
adapted to a wide range of climates rather than a well-defined specific climate.  The challenge is 
therefore either to reduce the lifespan of the capital (existing as well as future), but at the risk of 
high replacement costs, or to build more robust structures capable of adapting to different types 
of climates, but at higher initial costs. Moreover, the risk of maladaptation is greater when the 
lifespan of the capital is particularly long (see Section   1.2 and Box n°1). 
Urbanism involves even longer time horizons because the structure of a city (e.g., in terms 
of density) is an almost totally irreversible choice.  Moreover, action is difficult in this sector, as 
demonstrated  by  the  multiple  failures  in  this  area  and  problems  to  control  rapid  and 
uncontrolled urbanization in cities in developing countries where the large informal sector, real   
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estate pressure and the absence of land tenure make classic land use and urbanization policies 
almost totally ineffective.  
To orient the investment choices of private and public stakeholders toward a lower climate-
vulnerability  in  the  building  and  urbanism  sectors,  the  important  role  of  standards  and 
regulations has already been mentioned  (Section   2.2.2).  However, adaptation in sectors with 
long-term capital also involves the management of institutions (Section   2.2.3) to ensure, for 
example,  the  stability  of  public-private  partnerships,  and,  of  course,  the  choice  of  public 
investments stricto sensu (Section   2.2.4).  
2.3.2  Energy and transportation infrastructure  
Energy  and  transportation  networks  play  an  unquestionable  role  for  the  public  at 
large, and their extended interruption would generate considerable costs for the economy 
as a whole.  Their operation depends on infrastructure with very long lifespans (a significant 
part of the French national road network is built on former Roman roads).   It is within the scope 
of public action to ensure that these infrastructure adapt to climate change. 
Energy infrastructure, for production as well as transportation, are often located in 
areas that are highly vulnerable to climate change as a result of their proximity to water 
and the sea. This proximity is linked as much to technical constraints (cooling) as to economic 
constraints (access to ports and sea routes).  A first stage of adaptation will therefore be to 
ensure that this infrastructure effectively resists future climate constraints.  It should also be 
accompanied by action that takes account of the high sensitivity of energy supply and demand 
to climate conditions and climate change. 
Adaptation  measures  to  be  taken  in  this  sector  are  mainly  focused  on  changes  in 
planning procedures and technical criteria in order to better prepare new infrastructure 
for climate change, as well as on rehabilitation and, in some cases, on the protection of existing 
infrastructure.  The success of these efforts will depend on the capacity of a certain number of 
stakeholders involved in the design, construction, maintenance and operation of transportation 
infrastructure  to  develop  and  to  implement  coherent  approaches.    In  other  words,  the 
institutional challenge is central to the issue.     
2.3.3  Water and agriculture 
The case of water management provides an example of the role of standards, as well as the 
importance  of  interactions  between  sectors,  especially  in  terms  of  energy,  water  and 
biodiversity.  
Many standards and regulations can actually be used to control the level of water 
demand, e.g., by fixing acceptable levels of withdrawal or – in extreme cases – deciding that 
some activities that consume large quantities of water (particularly those related to agriculture) 
are not acceptable in water-scarce areas.  It is also possible to use economic instruments such as 
the price of water that will act as a price signal to indicate the scarcity of the resource and to 
promote the efficient use and withdrawal of water.  The challenge here is to solve potential 
conflicts between different uses, and take in account arbitrations between various economic 
sectors (electrical, agricultural, industrial and domestic production) and the maintenance of the 
flows necessary to preserve ecosystems.    
Agriculture is one of the sectors most directly affected by climate change.  Adaptation 
will  take  place  progressively  at  the  level  of  economic  agent  through  modifications  in 
agricultural  practices  (e.g.,  by  modifying  planting  dates  or  by  using  more  heat-resistant 
varieties) and by changing the nature of production itself with a probable shift of agricultural 
crops towards the north in the Northern Hemisphere (and towards the south in the Southern 
Hemisphere).  In some cases, we can also expect net gains for some crops and some regions, at 
least for a limited warming in the first part of this century.  These individual adaptation actions   
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will nevertheless require public action, if only to make them coherent with water and land-use 
management  policies.    Moreover,  some  adaptations  will  be  difficult  to  carry  out  at  the 
individual level alone.  For example, the creation of new sectors will undoubtedly be necessary, 
and to do this, coordination at the national level could be useful in conjunction with professional 
organizations.    Specific  cases  will  require  specific  actions,  such  as  Controlled  Appellations 
("Appellations d‟Origine Contrôlée or AOC)", whose definition is based on a terroir and a 
climate and that may have to be modified, for example, in the case of wine.  It should however 
be  observed  that  many  decisions  concerning  agriculture  are  made  for  relatively  short  time 
horizons and do not require immediate action.  
2.3.4  Ecosystems 
Likewise, public policies for managing ecosystems will have to be reviewed to ensure 
that  they  are  compatible  with  climate  change.  Ecosystems  threatened  by  climate  change 
(wetlands, forest areas, etc.) actually produce many environmental services that are of benefit to 
the community (air and water quality, protection of biodiversity, etc.), and public intervention is 
necessary in this case to ensure that these functions are "produced" in sufficient quantity.  Public 
action is both indirect (e.g., management standards for private forests) and direct (e.g., public 
service  management  of  some  forests  or  particularly  valuable  environmental  zones  such  as 
natural parks or coastal zones).  The problem is nevertheless very complex because the response 
of ecosystems to climate change is still poorly known.  The central challenge is the localization 
of ecosystems (and, therefore, the institutions that protect them like national parks, etc.) that 
may change in the future, making it perhaps necessary to modify land use and, more generally, 
to modify the geographic perimeter of certain activities.     
Forest  ecosystems  offer  a  particularly  interesting  example  in  this  case.  Due  to  the 
complexity of these ecosystems, the need for R&D is considerable in order to more effectively 
detect  and  understand  the  impacts  of  climate  change  on  forest  ecosystems  and  adaptation 
strategies, especially the introduction of more robust species or even exotic ones 
(18).  When the 
lifespan of certain forest species is on the same order of magnitude as that of infrastructure, 
public  investment  (the  choice  of  species  in  this  case)  raises  similar  decision  problems  in 
situations of uncertainty. Management standards and regulations, particularly those concerning 
taxation, play an important role in this decision and must be reviewed within the context of 
climate  change.    Finally,  climate  change  raises  the  question  of  forestry  institutions  and,  in 
particular,  the  cooperation  capacity  within  forest massifs  characterized  by a  high  degree  of 
fragmentation of private forest property.      
These  aspects  are  even  more  important  since  ecosystems  are  not  just  a  capital  to  be 
protected from climate change but can also be mobilized to strengthen the adaptability of 
our societies to this change.  This is the principle of "ecosystem-based adaptation".  Thus, 
natural wetlands very effectively provide protection from storm tides and exceptionally high 
tides, and can take the place of or supplement a seawall or another hard structure, therefore 
avoiding or reducing its negative impacts on biodiversity, erosion, landscapes or tourism.  This 
type  of  approach  is  used  around  New  Orleans  in  an  attempt  to  restore  wetlands  that  were 
destroyed during the last centuries.    
2.3.5  Insurance 
The role of regulation can be illustrated in the case of the insurance sector, effectively 
demonstrating that adaptation is not just a question of investment and infrastructure.  
From the point of view of insurers and reinsurers, climate change involves many modifications 
of  practices  that  will  probably  have  to  be  integrated  into  regulation  modifications  for  the 
insurance sector.  First, the actuarial approach to the probability of the occurrence of a natural 
disaster is no longer valid since the climate is changing.  This may make it necessary to abandon 
                                                       
18 In the French case, see Roman-Amat (2007), for example.   
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approaches based on historical data and use risk assessment models instead.  This was actually 
made  mandatory  in  Florida  after  Hurricane  Andrew  in  1992.  Second,  the  increase  in  the 
probability of occurrence of extreme events and the potentially higher correlation between risks 
make default risks greater for insurers and in fine for reinsurers, eventually justifying higher 
level of reserves.  The insurance sector is very highly regulated in all countries, and these 
changes will lead to modifications of these regulations.  In some countries, the central (or local) 
government is also a stakeholder in the insurance or reinsurance sector.  This is the case in 
France with the CAT-NAT system in which the government is responsible for losses linked to 
most natural disasters (with the notable exception of storms), as well as in Florida where the 
public insurer, Citizens, has a large share of the market, following the withdrawal of a large 
number of private insurers unable to face ever-increasing risks.  
More generally, insurance can also be considered as a tool for adaptation.  In particular, 
a high penetration of insurance allows economic stakeholders affected by a disaster to rebuild 
more rapidly and to avoid bankruptcies (particularly small businesses), and to therefore get the 
economy back on its feet more rapidly, limiting indirect economic losses (see an example on 
Mumbai in Ranger et al., forthcoming). Moreover, the presence of insurance (particularly for 
operating  costs)  enables  stakeholders  to  proceed  with  reconstruction  in  a  more  peaceful 
atmosphere and to therefore seize improvement opportunities, i.e., to reconstruct "better" rather 
than reconstructing "identically".  Finally, access to insurance against natural risks also allows 
some stakeholders to take higher risks as a result of the fact that it is shared and transferred to 
stakeholders who can handle it.  The risk can appear as a production factor, making it possible 
to strengthen the producers' position.  Thus, better risk distribution, thanks to insurers, increases 
the economy's ability to make the changes necessary to adapt to climate change.    
In theory, if insurance rates were representative of the risk level in a given area, access 
to insurance could also be used to provide information on their level of risk to businesses 
and households. This information would be communicated in the form of a price signal 
that they are not necessarily able to evaluate for themselves. This is not the case in France 
today  where  insurance  rates  for  natural  disasters  are  identical  in  all  areas,  at-risk  or  not.  
However,  the  idea  of  insurance  rates  determined  in  relation  to  risk  level  is  controversial.  
Basically, the transition from a fixed-rate system to a system where rates are based on risk level 
is complex since it could lead to very steep price increases whose  political acceptability is 
uncertain. Moreover, even outside of the transition phase, insurance rates directly related to risk 
level can lead to difficulties for the poorest households that sometimes settle in the highest risk 
zones where real estate costs are lower.  An increase in insurance rates could therefore eliminate 
this possibility, leading to the absence of insurance or increased difficulty in finding housing.  
In general, the question of natural risk insurance cannot be separated from questions 
of access to housing, the cost and availability of real estate and land-use planning. The 
example of Florida shows that insurance rates that are strictly determined by the level of risk 
can endanger the economic viability of some regions, with highly negative consequences for the 
populations  concerned.    Moreover,  hazard-prone  areas  are  not  only  associated  with  private 
advantages (such as a view of the sea), but also provide collective benefits (as in the case of port 
areas that are at risk but that make it possible to decrease the cost of imports for the population 
as a whole, like in the case of New Orleans).  Mixed solutions that take account of the risk level 
to create price signals while maintaining a high level of national solidarity can be considered in 
order  to  reconcile  these  different  requirements.    However,  these  measures  could  only  be 
initiated  if  they  are  highly  consistent  with  land-use  policies  and,  particularly,  with  zoning 
policies (i.e., the definition of hazard-prone areas in which limitations on construction apply).     
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3.  The territorial and spatial dimensions of adaptation   
An  important  particularity  of  adaptation  strategies  is  their  spatial  dimension.    An 
adaptation strategy cannot just address different sectorial needs but must integrate the 
different components of public action within an integrated territorial vision.  Thus, three 
main questions arise: (1) How to anticipate and manage changes in the localization of activities 
and populations (Section   3.1); (2) How to integrate the international impacts of climate change 
into  national  adaptation  plans  (Section    3.2);  and  (3)  How  to  distribute  adaptation  efforts 
between the different regions and territories (Section   3.3).  
3.1.  Maintain the status quo or take a new direction? 
In Section   1.2, we saw that maintaining identical activities or services can be too costly or 
even technically impossible in some cases.  In these cases, adapting to climate change requires a 
change in development trajectories. This bifurcation can either take the form of a change in 
location or that of a change in activity at the same site. An extreme example of location 
change  is  illustrated  by  some  island  states  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  that  may  no  longer  be 
inhabitable  at  some  point  in  the  future  if  the  rise  in  sea  level  exceeds  a  critical  threshold.  
Likewise, the impacts of climate change in some coastal areas may lead to the same type of 
relocations on the long-term as well.  The question is to know when and how to prepare for this 
type of change.     
3.1.1  Changes in activity 
An  example  of  a  possible  change  in  activity  at  the  same  site  is  provided  by  some 
countries  in  the  Mediterranean  region,  major  tourist  destinations  that  could  encounter 
difficulties in handling a drop in the tourist flow if summer temperatures go above a certain 
level (e.g., Bigano et al., 2008).  Given the importance of tourism for the development of certain 
regions (exceeding 8% of the GDP in many countries in the Southern Mediterranean such as 
Morocco and Egypt), the consequences would extend well beyond the tourism sector and would 
have an impact at the macroeconomic level.  Since many regional economies today are based on 
specialized  sectors  that  are  vulnerable  to  climate  change,  they  need  to  find  alternative 
development trajectories at the regional scale. 
Economic history suggests that specialized economies are very vulnerable to changes in 
variations  in  the  profitability  of  their  main  economic  sector.    In  French  regions  where 
mining activity disappeared in the 1970s, or in deindustrialized regions of the United States, the 
economy remained depressed for long periods of time in spite of the high-level financial support 
provided at the national and federal levels.  These experiences show that specialized economies 
have a limited capacity to deal with profitability shocks by transferring their resources to new 
sectors.    Beyond  a  certain  threshold,  the  "transition  capacity"  is  exceeded:    the  level  of 
education of employees in the sector concerned may become insufficient for the development of 
new sectors, and the investment capacity in new sectors may be too low.  Problems linked to 
investment capacity are particularly important when regional revenues decrease as a result of 
the drop in profitability of the main sector of a specialized economy.  
When designing an adaptation plan, it is therefore necessary to distinguish marginal 
disturbances that require a simple adjustment of practices, and structural changes made 
necessary  by  climate  change.    Public  action  and  transition  support  will  be  especially 
necessary in these latter cases that should be carefully identified.    
3.1.2  Relocation of populations and activities   
An example of geographic shift concerns the withdrawal from zones at the highest risk 
of flooding, e.g., due to the rise in sea level.  In some sparsely-populated coastal areas, it is 
more rational to withdraw inland than to try to protect the area at any price.  However, avoiding   
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densification of these areas and carrying out such a withdrawal raises technical, economic and 
political problems.  
In an ideal world, with perfect foresight, we could imagine that this withdrawal would 
take place naturally, with the value of assets and investments regularly decreasing as the risk 
in the zone increases.  At the time the zone should be evacuated, the assets would be at the end 
of their lifespan (i.e., totally depreciated) and would therefore have a zero value.  In this case, 
the cost of withdrawal would be null.  However, this is difficult to imagine for three reasons:  
  First, an urbanized zone is composed of many types of assets (housing, roads, water 
supply systems, etc.) that have very different lifespans, and it is difficult to imagine that 
all of these assets can arrive at full depreciation at the same time.    
  Then, it is not possible to stop all maintenance and to live in housing that deteriorates 
over time and whose comfort is compromised.  Likewise, it is not possible to live with 
roads whose quality (and, as a result, safety) deteriorates over time so that they reach 
the end of their lifespan at the time that withdrawal takes place.  Even if we establish a 
minimal threshold of acceptable comfort and/or safety, it is not realistic to schedule 
investments so that we arrive at total depreciation (financial) of the asset and at a given 
level of comfort and/or safety, due to uncertainties about asset degradation dynamics.  
We  can  clearly  see  that  this  approach  is  not  realistic  and  that  we  cannot  avoid 
abandoning assets that are still usable (with, therefore, a non-zero cost).  
  Finally, scheduling investments so that the asset is depreciated at the exact time the 
withdrawal is necessary would require perfect foresight and an error-free evaluation of 
the rise in sea level, which is totally unrealistic.  
An  anticipated  withdrawal  from  hazard-prone  areas  is  therefore  unlikely  without 
public action to coordinate it, and it cannot be done at low cost.  On the other hand, local 
governments can implement a concerted action (a "strategic withdrawal") in conjunction with 
urbanization  plans,  measures  taken  by  the  coastline  protection  board,  and  public  policies 
governing investment in infrastructure. Such an anticipated and strategic approach may be able 
to reduce significantly the cost, with respect to a reactive and non-coordinated withdrawal.    
3.1.3  Methodological and institutional implications of economic bifurcations and 
transitions 
From a methodological point of view, it is more complicated to assess economic shifts 
and transitions than to assess marginal or incremental changes. In fact, the comparison of 
two economic equilibrium states that are very different from each other requires multisectorial 
economic models that do not always exist and whose use remains complex.  Secondly, two 
economic equilibria that are very far from each other can be difficult to rank from an economic 
point of view 
(19). If tourism stops being a viable economic activity, it can be replaced by many 
different sectors (from manufacturing to services, for example), and it is not easy to decide 
which alternative activity is the best in terms of population welfare. Moreover, assessing the 
difference between two economic trajectories is often a question of measuring transition 
costs, not differences between final equilibria. If tourism as a main local activity has to be 
replaced, the question is not really whether manufacturing or services are better alternatives. 
The  question  is  how  one  can  create  these  alternative  activities,  and  at  which  cost.  These 
transitions are more difficult to evaluate because they require dynamic models.  
On a larger scale, we are dealing here with institutional questions about the way in 
which  territories  can  design  their  future  and  their  development  strategies.  This  is  an 
exercise in which all of the economic development dimensions must be taken into account. 
                                                       
19 In Hourcade and Kostopoulou (1994), we can find an example in the energy sector (see the discussion 
of changes in development trajectories in Najam et al., 2007).   
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However, the breakdown of responsibilities in different sectors (water, energy, risks, etc.) 
makes  it  difficult  to  manage  this  type  of  exercise.    Climate  change  could  nevertheless 
precipitate and facilitate reflections in this area.  In particular, a link must be developed between 
adaptation  and  current  ideas  on  low-carbon  or  green-growth  development  trajectories.  
Bifurcations  also  acutely  raise  the  question  of  accompanying  transitions  and  the 
management of the distribution effects of bifurcations at the financial, technical and human 
levels.     
3.2.  Adaptation of national territory within an international framework  
Adaptation to climate change does not stop at country borders.  On the contrary, climate 
change  requires  all  countries  and  particularly  developing  ones,  to  revise  their  development 
strategies in view of climate risks (Shalizi and Lecocq, 2009).  The impacts of climate change 
will  be  felt  throughout  the  world  with  the  likelihood  that  the  biggest  ones  will  be  felt  in 
developing economies or those in transition where resources to deal with them are scarcer (in 
physical,  financial,  human  or  institutional  capital).    These  international  impacts  will  have 
multiple induced effects at the international level that other countries will have to take into 
consideration in the development of their adaptation strategies.  
At  the  economic  level,  these  induced  effects  will  be  transmitted  through  markets,  with 
implications for international trade that will not always be easy to anticipate.  Research in the 
areas of forestry and agriculture in particular nevertheless leads us to believe that the impacts 
will  be  significant,  with  risks  and  opportunities  that  will  depend  on  the  sectors.    With  the 
probable opening of new trade routes in the Arctic Ocean during the two months of summer, we 
can expect a change in the geography of international trade that we should anticipate in order to 
take better advantage of it.  Moreover, climate change adaptation technologies can also open 
new  markets  for  domestic  firms,  especially  in  sectors  where  they  already  have  competitive 
advantages.  As previously mentioned, the experience acquired and the technologies available in 
tropical and sub-tropical countries could be developed in more temperate countries that will 
have to deal with similar climates in the future. This development will create opportunities for 
businesses from tropical and hot countries.   
The impact of future climate change on international migration is potentially very high, 
even though migration drivers are extremely complex and few migrations are triggered by a 
unique process.  Climate-related migration could concern arid regions located between humid 
tropics and temperate zones that are highly vulnerable to warming because of water deficits 
(Southeastern Europe, the Near East, North Africa, Central Asia). Moreover, climate change 
tends  to  exacerbate  tensions  on  resources  that  are  already  rare,  with  potentially  major 
implications  –  negative  or  positive  –  in  terms  of  security  (international  water  sharing,  for 
example).  
To avoid the future conflicts that some authors have warned about (Welzer, 2009), it is 
essential  to  associate  an  adaptation  strategy  with  cooperation  and  development  policies 
(OECD,  2009).  In  fact,  climate  change  is  an  additional  justification  for  development  aid.  
Adaptation to climate change will create new needs in terms of development aid and will also 
require that development stakeholders integrate this dimension into their projects and programs 
(Agence Française de Développement, 2006; World Bank, 2010).  Moreover, the industrialized 
countries are committed, within the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, to support the adaptation of developing countries. 
Until now, available resources have remained very modest but may increase if the promises 
made in Copenhagen are kept.  Even if these resources are well under the needs evaluated by 
development agencies, their implementation may reduce the negative impacts of climate change 
outside of the national territory.  If we take the interactions described above into account, this   
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type  of  process  would  facilitate  the  establishment  of  national  adaptation  strategies  in 
industrialized countries by reducing the external pressures that exist on these territories.    
Implementation of a real international cooperation policy in relation to adaptation to 
climate  change  has  unfortunately  remained  a  stumbling  block  in  international 
negotiations on the climate for several years and a bone of contention between developed and 
developing  countries.    It  always  comes  back  to  three  questions:  the  necessary  amount  of 
resources,  the  governance  of  the  institutions  responsible  for  financial  transfers,  and  the 
distribution of resources devoted to adaptation among the different countries.  To some extent, 
these questions are also found at the national level where it is also necessary to find the means 
to distribute resources earmarked for adaptation between the different regions and territories.  
3.3.  Allocation of resources for adaptation between regions and between sectors      
The question of knowing how to allocate  resources for adaptation between  regions and 
between sectors arises and will arise at every level of decision-making – local, regional, national 
and international.  We illustrate it here with the example of the allocation of resources at the 
international level, an example that has been much studied and that we can extend to other 
decision-making levels. 
In the case of the allocation of rare resources, the economist's reflex is to allocate the 
resources to projects whose marginal benefits for society – i.e., the social benefit for the last 
cent invested – are the highest. This picking rule allows us to obtain a portfolio of projects 
whose benefit is the highest for a given level of resources.  However, application of this rule 
raises two problems: a problem of evaluation and a problem of distribution.     
The  evaluation  problem  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  section.    In  contrast  to 
mitigation measures, no performance indicator exists for adaptation measures.  In theory, we 
can always compare these measures to each other by examining their monetary benefits in terms 
of damage avoided.   However, these benefits are uncertain and not always calculable ex ante.  
Limiting ourselves to adaptation measures that are subject to complete cost-benefit analyses 
could even be counter-productive since the choice would always be biased towards projects 
with  investments  in  physical  capital,  at  the  expense  of  "softer"  adaptation  measures,  often 
effective and less costly, but more difficult to assess with cost-benefit analyses.  Solutions exist 
to ensure fair competition between different adaptation measures, for example, by explaining 
the advantages and disadvantages of the different measures considered using a multicriteria 
approach.  
The  distribution  problem  is  also  particularly  sensitive.    In  contrast  to  mitigation, 
adaptation  benefits  are  mainly  local.    Consequently,  we  must  compare  measures  whose 
benefits go to very different individuals 
(20).  The economist's traditional approach in this case 
is to consider that, no matter what, we have to choose the most cost-effective projects and then 
eventually resort to financial transfers to satisfy any equity objective. The problem is that these 
types  of  transfers  are  difficult  to  imagine  at  the  international  level,  especially  if  official 
development assistance (ODA) expenses and adaptation expenses are separated.  Practically 
speaking, it is likely that international funds earmarked for adaptation are accompanied by an 
implicit  apportionment  formula  for  the  major  regions  of  the  world,  based  on  equity 
considerations.  It is then up to the international institution responsible for the allocation of 
these funds to allocate financing in the most effective way possible within the different regions.  
An additional difficulty arises from the fact that developing countries demand that resources 
earmarked for adaptation to climate change be over and above official development assistance 
                                                       
20 This is nevertheless not always the case.  For example, measures favoring R&D in terms of information 
technology or the supply of information on the impacts of climate change potentially benefit humanity as 
a whole.    
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(ODA), in order to limit the risk that the increase in resources earmarked for adaptation be to the 
disadvantage of ODA.  Nevertheless, it is not always easy, in practice, to separate resources 
earmarked  for  adaptation  from  those  earmarked  for  development  stricto  sensu.  A  second 
question  is  therefore  to  know  if  it  is  necessary  to  establish  a  separate  compatibility 
between adaptation and ODA, and if so, how.  
In a small number of cases, it is fairly easy to distinguish adaptation resources from 
development aid resources. For example, increasing the height of an existing seawall to cope 
with a rise in sea level is strictly linked to adaptation, but adaptation and development are 
generally interconnected.  On the one hand, adaptation and development aid are often financed 
within the framework of the same project, e.g., a rural development project that contains an 
adaptation component.  Moreover, adaptation and development cannot always be distinguished 
in reality.  For example, education has an impact on the ability of individuals to adapt, but it is 
impossible to determine the actual "share" of an education project that is devoted to adaptation.   
In  theory,  a  possible  approach  would  be  to  identify  the  “additional  cost”  of  a 
development  project,  compared  to  its  cost  if  climate  change  were  not  taken  into 
consideration.  However, in order to determine this difference, it would be necessary to build a 
hypothetical reference situation "without adaptation".  In addition to being time and resource-
consuming, this construction could just be impossible if adaptation and development are linked, 
or if the presence of climate change leads to a shift in activities.  In the latter case, the project 
"without adaptation" would be totally different from the project actually implemented. 
Subsequently, the separation between resources earmarked for adaptation and those 
linked to development appears to be a major risk for the implementation of development 
projects.  It is of utmost importance to be able to define simple methods to calculate the share 
devoted to adaptation in development projects in order to (i) reduce transaction costs in project 
finance,  and  (ii)  avoid  a  bias  in  favor  of  adaptation  measures  stricto  sensu  (i.e.  without 
development co-benefits), at the expense of adaptation measures linked to development projects 
(i.e., with development co-benefits). 
This discussion also has implications for the allocation of resources at the national level.  It 
suggests that it would be ineffective to base adaptation policy on a single dedicated budget 
managed  by  a  single  ministry  or  government  agency,  but  that  it  is  essential  to  integrate 
adaptation into different public policies (even though they are adaptation measures stricto sensu 
and coordination tasks that need to be funded).  
4.  Implementation steps of an adaptation strategy      
Many measures exist to adapt or help adapt to climate change. However, all adaptation 
measures are not desirable and some probably cost more than the value of the impacts that they 
can avoid. Moreover, among the effective and cost-effective measures, some will be necessary 
and  urgent,  whereas  others  will  only  be  implemented  in  several  decades.  It  is  therefore 
important to have a methodology to define an adaptation strategy that is both coherent and 
effective.  Several approaches are possible, depending on the initial situation and the means 
available. This report proposes a methodology that is obviously not the only one possible. 
The methodology proposed is based on the main idea that adaptation is a dynamic 
process and that, as a result, we must design a strategy for only several years, but one that 
takes the long-term into account and that can be readjusted throughout the century as 
new information becomes available.  Within this framework, in addition to determining 
what must be done, we must, above all, determine when it must be done, taking possible 
time arbitrages into account, and who is responsible for doing it.  
The methodology proposed here to build an adaptation strategy includes seven steps, to be 
applied at the same time to each of the sectors concerned, and then globally:   
26/39 
Step No.1: Construction of climatic and economic scenarios on which the work will be 
based (see Section   5.2), and identification of the impacts of climate change and possible 
adaptation  measures.  The  basic  material  on  which  public  decision-makers  will  base  their 
decisions  is  precisely  a  collection  of  possible  adaptation  measures,  proposed  by  different 
stakeholders and different institutions 
(21). The definition of a plan must therefore begin by 
ensuring that this basic material does not contain a major omission, i.e., that the major impacts, 
the  major  economic  sectors,  all  of  the  territories  and  all  of  the  social  categories  are  well 
represented, and then by determining which measures have priority. 
Step  No.2:  Screening  of  identified  adaptation  measures,  taking  into  account  the 
urgency of their implementation.  It is useless to include all of the adaptation measures in a 
first  plan.    Some  measures  or  investments  can  wait  decades.  The  selection  of  measures 
depends  both  on  the  dynamics  of  climate  change  impacts  and  the  dynamics  of  the 
concerned economic sectors.  For all practical purposes, priority measures are those that aim at 
reducing impacts that are, in decreasing order of importance:    
  going to occur in the near future (see Box n°3), or can that already be observed (e.g., the 
increase in the frequency of heat waves);    
  going to occur in a distant future or that are limited to extreme warming conditions, but 
that are well established scientifically and for which adaptation strategies will only have 
an effect on the very long-term (e.g., a limited rise (< 1 m) in sea level and land-use 
plan);  
  going to occur in a distant future or that are limited to extreme warming conditions and 
that  are  highly  uncertain,  but  with  potentially  serious  consequences  and  for  which 
adaptation strategies will only have an effect on the very long-term (e.g., major rise (> 1 
m) in sea level). 
Step No.3:  For each impact, different possible adaptation measures must be identified and 
then evaluated by a relatively simple multicriteria analysis of their costs and benefits.  This 
evaluation  can  be  done  by  using  quantitative  models  or  methods  when  possible,  or  from 
qualitative analyses or experts' opinions when models are not available (which is often the case).  
This analysis must satisfy several criteria:    
  The analysis must not just integrate the monetary market costs, but must also take 
the many different dimensions of costs and benefits into account 
(22): impacts on the 
quality of life, impacts on health, impacts on biodiversity, impacts on inequalities and 
the distribution of wealth, individual and social security, etc. It is particularly important 
to determine who would pay for a measure and which financing sources should be 
considered, as well as to ascertain who would directly profit from the benefits of the 
measure.  Each measure can in fact lead to redistribution effects, with winners and 
losers.  The  geographic and temporal distribution of costs and benefits must be 
considered.  It is particularly important to determine when the costs of the measure will 
come to bear (initial investment vs. annual cost) and at what point in time the benefits 
will appear.   
  The analysis must take in into account synergies (and conflicts) with other policy 
objectives and sectorial policies.  For example, the use of air-conditioning is often in 
contradiction with policy objectives in terms of energy consumption and greenhouse 
gas emission reductions; the modification of a building can be oppose for patrimonial 
                                                       
21 The French case is interesting in this respect because the first stage of the construction of the National 
Adaptation  plan  is  precisely  a  broad  consensus-building  phase  with  the  different  socio-economic 
stakeholders that aims at identifying an initial and very wide-ranging list of possible adaptation measures. 
22 A more in-depth discussion of these aspects can be found in Hallegatte et al. (2011).   
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and cultural reasons (preservation of cultural and historical heritage). In contrast, the 
implementation of more restrictive land-use plans is often synergistic with natural risk 
reduction.  These  oppositions  or  synergies  can  sometimes  be  expressed  as  costs  or 
monetary co-benefits (e.g., for energy consumption), but this is not always the case 
(e.g., heritage preservation).  As a first step, it is possible to look for "no regret" 
measures  for  which  the  co-benefits  alone  justify  the  implementation  of  the 
measure.  
  The analysis must assess the robustness to uncertainty: first, obviously, in terms of 
climate uncertainty (is it doable to implement a measure that provides benefits for all 
possible  future  climates?),  as  well  as  in  terms  of  uncertainty  on  socio-economic 
developments (e.g., in relation to the geographic distribution of the population within a 
national territory or to the existence of new technologies to save water). We will first 
look for robust measures (which are beneficiary in all of the cases) or flexible (that 
can be adjusted in view of new information in the next decades) (Hallegatte, 2009).      
Step No.4: The preceding step must identify a relatively reduced set of promising measures.  
More in-depth studies – i.e., more time-consuming and work-intensive – could then be 
carried out.   This is especially the case for cost-benefit analyses.  These analyses should not 
neglect the points mentioned in Step 3, and particularly the uncertainty about climate change 
and  socio-economic  trends  and  redistribution  effects  (in  terms  of  time,  geography  and 
sociology), as well as the coherence with other objectives or sectorial policies.  This type of 
analysis is a complement to (but does not replace) the multicriteria studies mentioned above 
because it provides a much finer analysis of the effects of time and specific arbitrations between 
different alternative solutions. 
Step No.5: Measures will be selected on the basis of the results of different analyses – 
particularly multicriteria and cost-benefit – and the resources that are available. Particular 
attention must be given to the coherence between different measures of an adaptation strategy 
and the consistency with other sectorial policies.  For example, responses to climate change in 
terms of electricity production (cooling of thermal and hydroelectric power plants), irrigated 
agriculture,  and  protection  of  the  biodiversity  of  river  ecosystems  cannot  be  designed 
independently of each other because the volume of water available must be shared between 
these uses and must allow the implementation of each of these responses.  Therefore, trade-offs 
between adaptation measures (and, thus, between sectors) will be necessary.  Consistency with 
other sectorial policies is also crucial.  For example, adaptation of agriculture to climate change 
must  take  other  policy  objectives  into  account  (income  support  for  farmers,  reduction  of 
pesticide use, etc.)  It will therefore be necessary to look for synergies and to identify conflicts.  
Once again, it will be necessary to arbitrate between existing policy objectives and adaptation to 
climate change.     
Step  No.6:  For  each  of  the  measures  selected,  an  adaptation  plan  must  include 
indicators of the effectiveness of the measure, as well as a time horizon for which effects 
must be visible on the indicators.  For example, in the case of a modification of a land-use 
policy,  the  number  of  new  buildings  built  in  a  flood-prone  area  can  be  monitored  and  its 
reduction measured and controlled to ensure that the measure achieves its goal.  It should be 
mentioned that the indicator is not necessarily the level of climate damage itself.  Therefore, for 
a land-use policy, the number of buildings in a flood-prone area is indicative of the success of a 
policy before a drop in economic losses linked to flooding can be measured. Considering the 
time  horizons  of  various  measures,  an  adaptation  strategy  must  include  its  assessment  and 
adjustment possibilities.   
Step No.7: The effectiveness of the adaptation strategy must be evaluated and adjusted 
in relation to: (1) the results of preceding measures, using indicators defined when the measures 
were implemented; (2) new scientific information about climate change; (3) socio-economic and   
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technological changes that could have taken place.  This is done by going through the same 
process, beginning with Step 1. Even if monitoring is continuous, a complete revision can take 
place on a regular basis.  This should probably be done between five and ten years after the 
initial implementation of the strategy. 
Questions linked to the operational implementation of such a process, especially related 
institutional and legal questions, require a detailed analysis.  This analysis should be specific to 
each country, to take into account local contexts and pre-existing governance habits, and is not 
in the scope of this report.   
  
Box n°3: Forecasting climate change for the near future (2010-2030) 
It would be extremely useful to be able to forecast climate change over the next two decades 
in order to implement adaptation plans.  However, climate change is relatively limited at these 
time  scales,  and  climate  variability  is  such  that  the  climate  signal  is  not  dominant.  
Consequently, climate models, which only reproduce natural variability at the statistical level, 
are incapable of predicting changes in the near future.  It is therefore essential not to over-
interpret the results of these models and not to use their output as forecasts, without taking into 
account natural variability.  
The inability of models to predict climate changes in the next two decades could change if 
work on the ten-year forecast – a focus of research today – progresses.  This would nevertheless 
require considerable strides in numeric modeling and better knowledge of ocean conditions that 
determine climate change on these time scales.  Improved knowledge requires more developed 
measurement networks in oceans worldwide.   
 
5.  The use of economic instruments in the development of an adaptation strategy   
In the methodology proposed in the preceding section, economic assessment of adaptation 
measures plays an important role.  This section therefore focuses on the question of assessment, 
i.e., on Steps 3 and 4, to propose approaches that would allow us to take into consideration the 
specificities of adaptation described in Section   1.2, and primarily, uncertainty, dynamics, inertia 
and possibilities of economic bifurcations and transitions.  
Cost-benefit analysis of adaptation measures is made difficult by the  uncertainty on the 
impacts of climate change and therefore on the benefits of adaptation measures. In presence of 
uncertainty, several assessment methods are available, depending on the type of information we 
have on climate scenarios and on the type of hypotheses that we would like to formulate (or not) 
on their probabilities of occurrence (Section   5.1).  In all of these methods, the choice of climate 
scenarios is a key element.  In Section   5.2, we therefore propose elements that will allow us to 
choose the scenarios to be considered. Nevertheless, we believe that, despite uncertainty, 
cost-benefit analysis (public or private) is the method of reference, provided that sufficient 
information is available.  The way in which this method can be applied to the assessment of 
adaptation policies is discussed in Section   5.3. 
5.1.  Comparing adaptation methods in the presence of uncertainties    
Following is the description of four methods that allow us to compare adaptation measures 
within a context of uncertainty about the future climate.     
The first method is cost-benefit analysis with uncertainty:  In this case, we are dealing 
with  uncertainty  in  relation  to  climate  scenarios  by  attributing  subjective  occurrence 
probabilities  to  them  (i.e.,  based  on  beliefs  determined  from  actual  knowledge  rather  than   
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occurrence frequencies).  The “best” project will then be the one that maximizes the expected 
net  present  value  (i.e.,  the  average  of  the  costs  and  benefits  weighted  by  the  occurrence 
probabilities for  every  possible  states  of  the  world) 
(23).  When  the  necessary  information  is 
available, cost-benefit analysis is particularly useful because it makes it possible to evaluate 
policies  in  all  possible  cases,  as  well  as  enabling  a  fine  trade-off  between  measures,  for 
example, when there are different consequences in terms of time or space distribution of costs 
and benefits.  Even when all of the information necessary for the calculation is not available, a 
sensitivity analysis often makes it possible to reveal trade-offs that are not necessarily obvious 
beforehand.  We will come back to the use of cost-benefit analysis to assess adaptation policies 
in Section   5.3.  
A criticism often made of cost-benefit analysis with uncertainty is the little importance 
it attributes to low-probability high-impact scenarios, while policies are often specifically 
implemented to avoid these scenarios.  To avoid this problem, we can use "risk management" 
models whose principle is to limit the probability that losses reach a critical level.  In practice, 
we look for an adaptation policy in which scenarios with losses exceeding 1% of the GDP will 
have  a  cumulative  occurrence  probability  of  less  than  one  in  a  thousand 
(24).    The  hazard 
threshold retained (1% of the GDP in this case) and the cumulated occurrence probability (one 
in a thousand here) are subjective and have to be determined through a political process.  
An extension of the preceding method is sequential analysis (e.g., Ambrosi et al., 2003) 
that aims at minimizing the cost of maintaining the possibility of reaching a given target 
despite uncertainty over a period in the near future (e.g., 2010-2020).  In the case of a rise in 
sea level, for example, we can assume beforehand that there are three possibilities (20 cm, 80 
cm, 140 cm), and that we will know which of these three values is correct in 2020.  After 2020, 
we can therefore implement an optimal policy in relation to the true value thanks to a cost-
benefit analysis within a context of certainty.  Between 2010 and 2020, within a context of 
uncertainly, we apply a strategy aimed at  minimizing the "cost of the error".  This cost is 
expressed in the value of buildings that eventually have to be abandoned if predictions of the 
rise  in  sea  level  were  too  optimistic  at  the  building  stage,  and  in  loss  of  construction 
opportunities  if  predictions  were  too  pessimistic  (and  therefore  leading  to  too  restrictive 
measures) 
(25).  
Nevertheless, these three methods require subjective occurrence probabilities for each 
climate scenarios.  However, it is often difficult to determine these probabilities in the case 
of climate change.  In practice, we often only have a set of possible scenarios to work with.  
In this case, we can use a scenario-by-scenario decision approach (see, e.g., Lempert and 
Schlesinger, 2000), and look for policies that are acceptable within a maximum number of 
scenarios.  We therefore no longer attempt to maximize the benefits within a given scenario (or 
within the average of a set of scenarios) but, instead, to remain above the acceptable level of 
benefits for the set of scenarios (or for as many scenarios as possible).  The most rigorous 
version of this method, in which we try to remain above an acceptable level  for all of the 
scenarios, is similar to what is referred to as the "maximin approach", in which we simply 
attempt to optimize the most pessimistic scenario.  The disadvantage of this approach is that the 
set of strategies is determined on the basis of the most pessimistic hypothesis that is generally 
                                                       
23 To take risk aversion into account, we can also work in expected utility rather than in monetary costs 
and benefits, making it possible to consider basic needs and the asymmetry between profits and losses. 
24 In the same way, we can establish a policy so that the worst-case scenarios with a probability of 1 in a 
thousand lead to losses of less than 1% of the GDP.   
25 This method is based on the concepts of option value and quasi-option value (Henry, 1974; Arrow and 
Fisher, 1974), as well as on the information value, and explicitly takes into account the possibility of 
delaying decision-making to avoid becoming involved in a strategy that would be vulnerable to new 
information.  It also encourages the choice of robust, flexible and reversible strategies that are capable of 
adjusting themselves to new data.   
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highly unlikely.  We therefore focus all of our attention on extreme scenarios and give no 
credence to the most likely scenarios.  In the most flexible versions of the approach, we simply 
attempt to limit the number of scenarios in which results are considered as unacceptable, where 
"unacceptable" is obviously defined by a political process.  This approach therefore aims at 
implementing measures that are sufficiently effective within all the scenarios, i.e., uncertainty-
robust measures or measures that can be adjusted when new information becomes available, 
e.g., flexible or reversible measures (see Hallegatte, 2009, for an application to adaptation to 
climate change).     
Two remarks should be made in conclusion to this section. First, no method is perfect. The 
different methods proposed here can be used depending on the information available about 
occurrence probabilities and depending on policy choices, particularly on the importance given 
to extreme scenarios.  The differences between the methods proposed are not as great as they 
may  appear  at  first  glance.  In  fact,  subjective  probabilities  can  be  chosen  to  reflect  strict 
preferences in relation to extreme scenarios. 
In contrast, a scenario-by-scenario decision approach has the disadvantage of making the 
comparison between protection costs and expected benefits implicit, a comparison that is central 
to the discussion on public policies.  It therefore appears preferable, whenever possible, to 
use a cost-benefit analysis with at least two "optimistic" and "pessimistic" scenarios (see 
Section   5.2) to which we attribute subjective occurrence probabilities, being careful (i) to 
examine the robustness of results to difference choices of probabilities, and (ii) to specify 
as  a  constraint,  the  non-realization  of  some  states  of  the  world  considered  to  be 
unacceptable. This type of analysis actually makes it possible to explore, to the greatest extent 
possible,  the  realm  of  possibilities,  to  identify  eventual  breaking  points,  and  to  test  the 
consistency of beliefs about climate change and the level of action.        
Within this context of radical uncertainty, cost-benefit analysis, like the other methods 
presented in this section, would only be able to provide a response contingent on a set of 
beliefs  about  the  future  and  an  attitude  in  relation  to  risk,  rather  than  "the"  good 
response to the level of adaptation. In conclusion, the decision is political and the role of the 
analysis is to shed light on it.  In this respect, an essential criterion for choosing between the 
methods presented here is that the method chosen must be the most apt, under the current 
circumstances, to be   "language of and issue of negotiation" between decision-makers (in 
the words of Claude Henry, 1984). The transparency of the hypotheses and the clarity of the 
calculation are absolutely essential to the analysis in this case. 
5.2.  Choosing climate scenarios  
In all the methods described above, it is necessary to evaluate the costs and benefits of 
adaptation  measures  within  several  climate  scenarios.  In  fact,  the  choice  of  adaptation 
measures depends, to a large extent, on the choice of climate scenarios. For example (see 
Hallegatte et al., 2007a), the installation of air-conditioning in a certain number of sensitive 
places (retirement homes, hospitals, housing for the elderly, etc.) may be sufficient to adapt to 
limited climate change, and it would thus be useless to change building standards.  On the other 
hand, in the event of larger climate change, a generalization of air-conditioning or structural 
modification is indispensable, and it would therefore be desirable to change building standards 
for new structures as of today.  The question of the scenario selection is therefore extremely 
important. Designing an adaptation strategy on the basis of a single climate scenario could 
lead to major maladaptation and could be worse than no action at all.  It is for this reason 
that  the  methodology  proposed  in  Section  4  begins  with  the  selection  of  climate  and 
economic scenarios.      
In the absence of mitigation policy, IPCC models project an increase of average annual 
temperatures  from  2  to  6°C  worldwide  between  now  and  2100.  This  range  includes  the   
31/39 
uncertainty related to the greenhouse gas emissions scenario and the uncertainty related 
to the response of the climate to a given concentration of greenhouse gases.  This range is 
reduced in presence of climate policies. Its upper level, in particular, decreases. However, it is 
difficult  to  determine  the  scope  of  future  climate  policies  at  this  time,  and  the  announced 
international objective of limiting warming to 2°C cannot be considered as a certainty. As for 
the rise in sea level, uncertainty is even greater, with scientific publications projecting a rise of 
between 20 cm and 1.5 m, depending on the case.  Finally, for shorter time spans (2010-2030), 
it  is  of  utmost  importance  to  take  natural  variability  into  account  since  it  can  significantly 
modify climate changes and obscure or magnify overall climate change (see Box n°3). 
In this uncertain situation, it is reasonable to use several scenarios and to ensure that the 
measures implemented are either robust in terms of this uncertainty or can be adjusted as new 
information becomes available.  Concerning the choice of scenarios, we propose:   
  An optimistic scenario, assuming ambitious climate policies at the international level 
(comparable to an SRES/B1 scenario) and a low-level climate response to greenhouse 
gases.  
  A pessimistic scenario, assuming the absence of ambitious measures to limit global 
warming (comparable to an SRES/A1 or A2 scenario), and a strong climate response.  
On  this  basis,  precipitation  and  the  geographical  structure  of  climate  change  can  be 
extracted from climate model output.  A high degree of uncertainty exists in relation to the local 
expression of climate change, and different models lead to very different regional patterns.  In 
theory, it would be necessary to use as many models as possible to carry out this work. In 
practice, we can use the most contrasted models.     
As explained in Section   4, in the case of very big impacts and long adaptation times (for 
example, the loss of a highly urbanized area due to the rise in sea levels), it is reasonable to 
take the most pessimistic scenarios into account, even if their probability is very low 
(26), 
whereas for more limited impacts, we can take only the most likely scenarios into account.  
We can compare this approach to that of insurance for risk-averse stakeholders: for very 
serious  events  (house  fires  or  disability),  we  are  ready  to  pay  for  insurance,  even  if  the 
probability of occurrence is low (because the aversion to the risk is such that the loss of utility 
increases  non-linearly  with  the  loss);  for  less  serious  events,  insurance  may  no  longer  be 
justified if the probability is too low because we are capable of dealing with the event should it 
occur.  Therefore, the choice of an extremely pessimistic scenario can be justified if the 
potential  consequences  are  very  serious.  When  developing  an  adaptation  plan,  we  can 
therefore sometimes choose to use the most pessimistic hypotheses in the case of particularly 
vulnerable sectors.      
5.3.  Application of cost-benefit analysis to the assessment of adaptation policies      
Cost-benefit analysis (private or public, depending on the case) is a very powerful tool for 
assessing adaptation policies.  This method - commonly used to analyze public policies – is 
general  and  can  be  applied  to  all  types  of  private  and  public  investments.    A  complete 
description of the method is well beyond the scope of this paper.  However, the interested reader 
will find detailed information about the method and its most recent developments elsewhere. 
We are interested here in the way in which this method can be used to evaluate adaptation 
projects and, in particular, investment projects concerning long-term capital.     
                                                       
26 This approach is similar to "hazard management" used, for example, for the dangerousness of chemical 
products.   
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The  purpose  of  cost-benefit  analysis  is  to  compare  projects  or  policies  among 
themselves in order to determine which one will provide the greatest net benefit for the 
individual conducting the analysis (private cost-benefit analysis) or for society at large 
(public cost-benefit analysis).       
The  cost-benefit  analysis  approach  (private  as  well  as  public)  is  simple:  (i)  identify 
competing projects; (ii) identify sources of uncertainty and future possible states of the world; 
(iii) evaluate the costs and benefits for each project, in all possible states of the world; (iv) 
calculate the present value of costs and benefits; (v) calculate the expected net present value of 
different competing projects (if we have or can estimate the occurrence probabilities of states of 
the world); and (vi) evaluate the robustness of the result, including in relation to hypotheses on 
probabilities.     
Identification of competing projects in the case of adaptation raises no specific problem.  In 
contrast, it is important to realize that the initial (current) situation is not necessarily optimal 
in relation to current climate risks.  It is therefore essential to define the reference situation in 
relation to which the measures are evaluated so that the figures provided have a meaning (see 
Box n°4).  In the case of protection projects concerning natural risks, it is, in fact, common that 
the protection levels observed in the field are not the result of a specific risk analysis and an 
explicit policy choice but, instead, are the result of an empirical historical process.  In reality, 
"constant risk level" adaptation projects (i.e., reasoning in terms of efficiency costs rather than 
benefit costs) generally do not lead to optimal adaptation in relation to climate change. 
The  specificity  of  adaptation  projects  is  that  their  assessment  must  take  the  risks 
linked  to  climate  change  impacts  into  account  (limiting  risks  is  the  rationale  for  these 
projects).  As we emphasized above, uncertainty about climate change impacts is particularly 
important, and even more so at the level of small geographic scales.  On the one hand, it is 
difficult to list all of the possible states of the world.  On the other, it is not possible to link 
objective  occurrence  probabilities  to  these  states  –  for  instance  because  their  occurrence  is 
partially dependent on future mitigation actions.    
Once the different climate scenarios are established, identification and evaluation of the 
costs and benefits of adaptation measures does not necessarily present any particular difficulties.  
However, two important points must be stressed. First, even for a given climate scenario, the 
impacts and, therefore, the costs and benefits of adaptation measures can be uncertain. 
For example, the response of forest ecosystems to climate change is widely unknown. Second, 
climate  shocks  often  have  significant  indirect  effects  (for  example,  the  effect  of  the 
degradation of an infrastructure on the rest of the economy, etc.) (see, e.g., Hallegatte et al., 
2007b; Hallegatte, 2008).       
In addition, climate change adaptation measures can have significant co-benefits or co-costs.  
For example, a modification of building norms can lead to an improvement in the comfort of 
housing units, in addition to making them more effectively adapted to climate change.  We can 
even imagine that investments made within the framework of an adaptation plan could provide a 
solution to certain pre-existing problems. These co-benefits and co-costs should be taken into 
account in the analysis. 
By way of construction, most of the adaptation questions that arise today – and that may 
therefore be analyzed from a cost-benefit point of view – deal with choices whose consequences 
have very long-term implications (at least several decades).  To assess these projects, as in the 
case of the assessment of mitigation projects, the discount rate adopted is therefore an important 
element in the analysis.  This is neither the time nor place to discuss the discount rate.  In any 
case, discount rates for public projects are often set by the government (the Green Book in the 
United Kingdom, the report of the French Planning Office in France (Lebègue, 2005), of the 
Office of Management and Budget circulars in the USA). Moreover, the discount rate often has   
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less impact on the final result than uncertainty on the impacts of climate change (Lecocq and 
Hourcade, 2004) and, therefore, on the benefits of adaptation measures.      
 
Box n°4: Different definitions of adaptation cost 
When  analyzing  adaptation,  it  is  important  not  to  assume  that  the  current  situation  is 
optimal.  It is in fact common that observed protection levels are not the result of a specific risk 
analysis and an explicit policy choice. Instead, they are often the result of an empirical historical 
risk management process. We can therefore observe situations in which the existing natural risk 
level is too high, compared to the level that would be considered ideal if a risk analysis was 
actually conducted, or too low, i.e., with protection costs that are too high in relation to the 
optimal level.  
Adaptation  strategies  are  very  different  depending on  whether  they  begin  with  an  ideal 
situation where the flood risk level is at its optimal value, or a sub-optimal situation.  This 
difference  is  illustrated  in  the  table  below.    The  real  situation  today  is  that  of  square  1,  a 
situation  where  the  risk  is  not  necessarily  at  its  optimal  value.    Different  definitions  of 
adaptation are represented in the table below, which is interpreted as follows:   
  The passage from square 1 to square 2 is the reduction of the “adaptation gap”, i.e., the 
passage from a sub-optimal situation to a situation that would be optimal in the absence of 
climate change.  
  The  passage  from  square  2  to  square  4  is  adaptation  in  the  strict  sense,  i.e.  the 
investment necessary because of climate change alone, to go from an optimal state without 
climate change to a new optimal state with climate change.  This type of adaptation can be 
qualified as " adaptation stricto sensu" and corresponds to actions that would not be desirable 
without climate change and that only become desirable because there is a change in climate. 
  The direct passage from square 1 to square 4 is the trajectory that should be followed in 
practice,  i.e.,  passage  from  the  current  sub-optimal  situation  without  climate  change  to  an 
optimal situation with climate change.  This adaptation can be qualified as "optimal adaptation".  
  Finally, the passage from square 1 to square 3, i.e., maintaining the risk at its initial 
level, can be qualified as "constant level adaptation".  This type of constant level adaptation is 
often that which is analyzed in the scientific literature when authors begin with the premise that 
the current situation is optimal.    
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When climate scenarios and their subjective occurrence probabilities have been determined, 
when the costs and benefits of adaptation measures have been estimated, and when the discount 
rate has been chosen, obtaining the net present value of competing projects is only a question of 
calculation.  On the other hand, as we have already mentioned above, a sensitivity analysis is 
absolutely necessary for the cost-benefit analysis results to have a meaning. Many methods 
are available to carry out this assessment, from the simple variation of a parameter – all the 
others being constant – to complex numerical methods such as the Monte Carlo method.  Once 
again, the important point here is that the cost-benefit analysis (or any of the other methods 
described above) cannot claim to provide "the" best adaptation project but can, instead, lay out 
the  conditions  (including  beliefs  about  climate  change)  under  which  one  or  another  of  the 
projects is preferable.     
6.  Summary 
Adaptation has long been neglected in the debate and policies surrounding climate change.  
However, increasing awareness of climate change has led many stakeholders to look for the best 
way  to  limit  its  consequences  and  has  resulted  in  a  large  number  of  initiatives  related  to 
adaptation, particularly at the local level.  Adaptation has also become increasingly important in 
international negotiations.   
Adaptation can be defined as the set of organization, localization and technical changes that 
societies will have to implement to limit the negative effects of climate change and to maximize 
the beneficial ones.  This definition encompasses extremely varied types of actions that can be 
applied to a wide range of sectors.  Issues differ depending on geographic scales, zones and 
contexts, and its implementation involves a combination of widely diversified instruments.  
This paper proposes a general economic framework to help stakeholders in both the public 
and private sectors to develop effective adaptation strategies. To do this, it lays out the general 
issues involved in adaptation, identifies relevant public action levers and then describes their 
implications for the design of adaptation strategies.   
Four major issues for adaptation strategies  
To begin with, uncertainty on future climate needs to be taken into account. In fact, types of 
uncertainties with cumulative effects have to be considered: those related to the future evolution 
of  the  climate  at  global  scale  –  expected  impacts  of  climate  change  are  not  comparable 
depending on whether we choose a scenario with an average temperature increase of +2°C or 
one of +4°C; those related to the climate change scenario at the local level; and those related to 
future changes in the adaptation capacities of our societies. Uncertainty makes it necessary to 
assess adaptation measures in view of their degree of flexibility, i.e. their capacity to be adjusted 
if and when new information becomes available.    
Secondly,  given  the  degree  of  technical,  economic,  political,  institutional  and  cultural 
inertia, it is not always possible to take totally flexible adaptation measures. For example, the 
asset lifespan in sectors such as infrastructure, building or forestry is of  the same order  of 
magnitude  as  the  climate  change  time  scale  itself.    In  these  cases,  it  is  necessary  to  make 
adaptation choices without having complete information, despite the risk of "maladaptation" ex 
post.   
Thirdly, climate change is a continuous process.  As a result, the issue is not how to adapt to 
a "new" climate, but how and at what price we can adapt our societies to a "constantly evolving" 
climate. Adaptation must therefore be understood as a permanent transition policy on the very 
long-term.  An adaptation plan for several years is only a stage in this process.    
Finally, in some cases it is too costly or technically impossible to adapt "at the margin" 
while maintaining the same activities and existing services in the same place.  Adapting to   
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climate change may require bifurcations towards other activities and/or other locations, making 
it necessary for adaptation policies to be developed and applied within an intersectoral and 
systemic framework. This also implies that the future impacts of climate change should be 
immediately integrated into land-use planning choices and urbanization plans. The question of 
transitions between activities and/or between regions then becomes a central issue.   
The role of public policy in adaptation  
The legitimacy of public action in terms of adaptation is not obvious because the benefits of 
adaptation measures are generally private, inciting households, businesses and communities to 
act spontaneously. However, circumstances may exist in which this spontaneous adaptation runs 
the risk of being insufficient or even counter-productive.  Reflection is necessary on a case-by-
case basis to determine the areas in which intervention by public authorities is necessary.  This 
paper identifies four of them.   
First,  public  authorities  have  a  key  role  to  play  in  the  production  and  dissemination  of 
information on climate change and its impacts and on ways to adapt to it in order to allow 
private stakeholders to make intelligent, well thought-out decisions.  Transmitting information 
on uncertainty and on tools with which to analyze it is essential in this case.   
A second type of public action aims at adapting standards, regulations and tax measures.  
This paper takes the example of standards that affect water demand and those that relate to long-
term fixed capital (e.g., building and infrastructure). In addition to technical standards stricto 
sensu,  it  may  also  be  necessary  to  adapt  procedural  standards  as  well  as  other  norms  and 
standards not directly linked to the climate but that have an impact on adaptability (e.g., in the 
financial domain).    
The  third  type  of  public  action  concerns  institutions.  By  rapidly  and  unpredictably 
modifying circumstances, climate change will lead to increasing tension for institutions and 
existing contracts.  We must be sure that concerned institutions are capable of identifying the 
signals  that  precede  tensions  and  crises,  of  balancing  the  interests  of  the  different  parties 
involved, and of effectively implementing the solutions that they propose. History suggests that 
institutions  play  a  major  role  in  adaptation.  For  example,  Holland's  success  with  flood 
management  is  as  much  due  to  the  establishment  of  the  institutions  necessary  for  risk 
management as for its technical ability to build seawalls.    
The fourth type of public action deals with direct adaptation actions of governments and 
local communities in terms of public infrastructure, public buildings and ecosystems under the 
responsibility of government agencies, e.g., state parks and state and communal forests.  More 
generally speaking, it is necessary to integrate the future impacts of climate change into land-
use policies and major investments that influence land-use.  
Methods to be used to build a public adaptation strategy   
A seven-stage process to build an adaptation strategy is described in this paper.  It begins 
with  a  broad  identification  of  the  most  urgent  measures,  particularly  those  resulting  from 
imminent impacts or concerning choices to be made today but that will have very long-term 
consequences.  This  first  screening  based  on  urgency  identifies  what  is  most  important  and 
simplifies the building of an adaptation strategy.  
An adaptation strategy can then be built on this basis, especially by looking for robust and 
flexible measures that are able to cope with the uncertainty in future climates and to maximize 
the  adaptation  co-benefits.  Measures  whose  co-benefits  are  greater  than  their  cost,  often 
qualified as "no-regret", are of particular interest in this case. To build a long-term adaptation 
strategy, it is also necessary to build the indicators that will make it possible to assess the 
effectiveness of the measures, to allow for corrections and adjustments in following years.   
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Provided that uncertainty is satisfactorily integrated, cost-benefit analysis is an effective tool 
for assessing the economic opportunity of the adaptation measures considered.  However, other 
approaches and multicriteria analyses, in particular, are also essential to make the best possible 
individual and collective choices concerning adaptation, taking into account the complexity of 
the consequences of climate change and adaptation actions. 
7.  Recommendations 
The following three important messages could be drawn upon completion of this  paper.  
They served as a basis to establish a series of recommendations. 
  The first message concerns the legitimacy of public action in relation to adaptation, 
which  is  not  automatic  since  most  adaptation  actions  generate  private  benefits.    A 
reflection is therefore necessary on a case-by-case basis to determine the areas in which 
the intervention of public authorities is required or relevant.  
  The second message is that direct action on public assets, perhaps the most visible, is 
only  one  of  the  public  action  components  in  relation  to  adaptation.    The  primary 
responsibility  of  public  authorities  in  this  area  is  to  provide  a  favorable  adaptation 
framework  for  private  stakeholders,  particularly  through  actions  in  terms  of  the 
production  and  dissemination  of  information,  standards,  regulations,  taxation  and 
institutions. 
  The third message deals  with the role of economic analysis in the decision-making 
process.  Provided that uncertainty is correctly integrated, cost-benefit analysis is an 
invaluable tool for assessing climate change adaptation policies.  This tool is capable of 
reducing the range of relevant measures in a given situation, while it is generally unable 
to identify "the" good measure.  Group arbitration is therefore most often necessary to 
make a decision.  
To give a more tangible meaning to these general messages, the following recommendations 
were drawn up: 
  Governments and international institutions have a key role to play in the production and 
dissemination of information necessary to promote adaptation by all of the economic 
stakeholders.    In  particular,  we  must  ensure  that  uncertainty  is  properly  taken  into 
account in order to avoid mistakes that could lead to a maladaptation that could be 
worse than no action at all.     
  Specific investments will be necessary for successful adaptation.  However, we must 
remember  the  importance  of  "soft"  actions  that  have  an  impact  on  information, 
standards, regulations and institutions.  These generally low-cost measures can generate 
considerable benefits and are an indispensable addition to investment policies.    
  Without privileging a specific approach, we must not concentrate on adjustments at the 
margin of existing economic structures without evaluating the possibilities of  larger 
economic bifurcations or transitions.  This is especially the case in regions that depend 
on an activity that is highly vulnerable to climate change.      
  The  importance  of  the  challenges  inherent  in  sectorial  and  spatial  bifurcations 
(migrations of populations and capital) requires the creation of coordination tools to 
improve the way we conceive of adaptation policies related to a given territory in an 
integrated way, and to avoid inconsistencies and conflicts. 
  An adaptation plan must focus on urgent needs and not attempt to adapt societies to all 
of the impacts of the next 100 years.  Identification of priority actions is crucial.  Very 
long-term  impacts  should  be  taken  into  account  when  they  require  actions  whose   
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effectiveness is only real on a very long-term basis (e.g., urbanism and land-use plans). 
Low-probability scenarios should be taken into when their potential impact is very large 
(e.g., possibility of large sea level rise); when impacts are more limited, it is possible to 
focus only on the most likely scenarios.    
  Regular  review  mechanisms  are  necessary  to  take  new  scientific  information  into 
account  and  consequently  adjust  measures.    To  do  this,  the  development  of  a 
performance indicator for adaptation actions is important. 
  Adaptation must take synergies and conflicts with other policy objectives into account, 
and particularly mitigation policies for climate change and protection of biodiversity. 
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